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WHEN TRIBAL TREATY FISHING RIGHTS BECOME A MERE
OPPORTUNITY TO DIp ONE's NET INTO THE WATER AND
PULL IT ouT EMPTY: THE CASE FOR MONEY DAMAGES
WHEN TREATY-RESERVED FISH HABITAT IS DEGRADED

BRIAN J. PERRON"

Salmon may be one of our greatest natural treasures. They
have survived for two million years enduring floods,
droughts, disease, volcanic eruptions, and even ice ages.
Nowhere is the circle of life more apparent, tenacious and
poignant. And nowhere else would the loss of this life
cycle be so all encompassing, ecologically disastrous and
economically devastating.
I. INTRODUCTION

A recurring theme in Pacific Northwest Indian mythology deals
with malevolent individuals who blocked streams to prevent the salmon
from returning to their spawning grounds.2 Today, after a century of
pollution, the myth has quite possibly become reality as overfishing and
habitat destruction threaten salmon with extinction. Northwest Indian
tribes are among the many stakeholders in the salmon's future. In 1855
several tribes and the federal government entered into treaties, in which
the tribes reserved the exclusive right to take fish at all "usual and
accustomed grounds," and in the "streams running through or bordering
reservations." 3 In culmination of nearly seventy-five years of litigation

Brian Perron received his B.A. in 1996 from Pacific Lutheran University in Tacoma,
Washington and expects to receive his J.D. from William and Mary in 2001. Before
entering law school, Mr. Perron was a Fulbright scholar to Germany in environmental
law and economics.
'Christine Gregoire, Salmon Stakes, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Nov. 8, 1998, at El.
2 See BARBARA LANE, POLInCAL AND ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF INDIAN-WHITE CULTURE
CONTACT IN WESTERN WASHINGTON IN THE MID- 19TH CENTURY 13 (1973).

3 Treaty with Nisquallys, Dec. 26, 1854, art. I1I, 10 Stat. 1132 (1855); Treaty with
Dwimish Indians, Jan. 22, 1855, art. V, 12 Stat. 927 (1859); Treaty with S'Klallams, Jan.
26, 1855, art. IV, 12 Stat. 993 (1859); Treaty with Makah Tribe, Jan. 31, 1855, art. IV, 12
Stat. 939 (1859); Treaty with Walla-Wallas, June 9, 1855, art. II, 12 Stat. 945 (1859);
Treaty with Yakimas, June 9, 1855, art. M, 12 Stat. 951 (1859); Treaty with Nez Perce,

783

784

WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV.

[Vol. 25:783

over the scope of these treaty rights, a United States district court judge
held that the treaties entitled the tribes to a sufficient quantity of fish to
satisfy their moderate living needs, subject to a ceiling of fifty percent of
the harvestable run.4 In a later phase of the case, a succeeding judge held
that the right to take fish implied the right to environmental protection of
fish habitat.5 The United States Supreme Court affirmed the harvest
allocation decision, 6 but the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, citing the
absence of "concrete facts which underlie a dispute in a particular case,"
vacated the habitat protection decision. 7 As a result, over twenty-five
years after this litigation began, there is no definitive answer to the
questions of whether the treaties contain the right of habitat protection and
what remedies the tribes have if their treaty fisheries are forever destroyed.
Since the Ninth Circuit's decision, lower courts have consistently
implied a habitat protection right and have provided tribes with various
forms of injunctive relief. In many cases, however, injunctive relief and
continued negotiation offer no solace to the tribes whose fisheries have
already been destroyed. One federal district court judge recognized the
habitat protection right, but nonetheless held that money damages are
unavailable to compensate tribes for past losses sustained by fish runs at
the hands of development. 8 It is time for the courts to affirmatively
recognize that the tribes' right to harvest fish includes a right to habitat
protection that prohibits habitat degradation that significantly interferes
with the tribes' ability to harvest sufficient fish to satisfy their moderate
living needs. In defining the scope of the habitat protection right in such a
way, the tribes would be entitled to sue the federal and state governments,
as well as private parties, to recover monetary damages for habitat and run
degradation. Alternatively, the tribes would be entitled to compel
restoration and enhancement of fish habitat.
Recognition of treaty-habitat protection rights and a corresponding
ability to bring claims for money damages for habitat degradation would

June 11, 1855, art. III, 12 Stat. 957 (1855); Treaty with Tribes of Middle Oregon, June
25, 1855, art. I, 12 Stat. 963 (1859); Treaty with Qui-Nai-Elts, July 1, 1855, art. III, 12

Stat. 971 (1859); Treaty with Flatheads, July 16, 1855, art. III, 12 Stat. 975 (1959)
hereinafter Stevens Treaties].
See United States v. Washington (Phase 1), 384 F. Supp. 312, 343 (W.D. Wash. 1974),
rev'd, 935 F.2d 1059 (1979).
5See United States v. Washington (Phase I), 506 F. Supp. 187, 208 (W.D. Wash.
1980).
6 See Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n,

443

U.S. 658, 696 (1979) [hereinafter PassengerFishing Vessel].
7United States v. Washington (Phase II), 759 F.2d 1353, 1357 (1985).
8See Nez Perce v. Idaho Power Company, 847 F. Supp. 791, 811 (D. Idaho 1994).
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raise awareness of the losses that tribes will suffer if the salmon are
allowed to disappear, as well as the losses the tribes have already suffered.
Furthermore, the threat of great financial cost for compensating the tribes
for lost treaty fisheries and degraded treaty-fish habitat could awaken the
federal and state governments, as well as private parties, to the salmon's
dilemma. Ultimately, recognition of the habitat-protection right could be
used to enhance and protect Indian resources outside the Northwest.
Part II of this Note provides background on the tribal interest in
salmon, the treaties in which the tribes reserved their all-important fishing
rights, and the years of litigation that the tribes have endured to ensure
their rights. Part III discusses why a definitive ruling on the habitatprotection right is necessary, while Part IV discusses judicial explications
defining the scope of the habitat-protection right and how the current state
of the law has blended those definitions. Part V, the center of this Note,
discusses: why a money damages remedy is necessary to address treatyfish habitat degradation, what the source of that remedy is in the context of
claims against the government and private parties, and how money
damages would be calculated in such cases. Part VI examines an
alternative remedy: the right of tribes to compel fish habitat enhancement
and restoration. Part VII discusses statutory causes of action that might
preempt a treaty right to habitat protection. Part VIII discusses how the
habitat-protection right might be applied to enhance and protect tribal
resources outside the Northwest. Finally Part X concludes this Note.
II. BACKGROUND

A. Tribal Interest in Salmon
The Pacific salmon is a magnificent species. 9 Prior to European
settlement in the nineteenth century, Pacific Northwest tribes relied
9 There are five species of Pacific Salmonids: (1) Oncorhynchus (0.) tshawytscha, the

chinook or king salmon; (2) 0. nerka, the sockeye or red salmon; (3) 0. kisutch, the coho
or silver salmon; (4) 0. keta, the chum or dog salmon; and (5) 0. gorbuscha, the pink or
humpback salmon. See R.J. CHILDERHOSE & MARJ TRIm, PACIFIC SALMON 25-26
(1979). The genus name "Oncorhynchus" means "hooked snout." The species names are
derived from Russian because they were first described by a naturalist on the 1737 Bering
expedition. See id. The steelhead trout (a sea-run rainbow trout), Salmo gairdneri,is
more closely related to the Atlantic salmon, Salmo salar, than to the Pacific species,
because it is a non-anadromous species. See id. Distinctive local groups within each
species of salmon are called stocks. See id. A run is a common stock of fish on their way
to breed in their freshwater home. See FAY G. COHEN, TREATIES ON TRIAL 25 (1986)
(citing Wash. Dept. of Fisheries et al., JointStatement, p. xx).
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heavily upon salmon, an anadromous fish.' 0 As a migratory fish, salmon
swim hundreds, even thousands of miles away from their place of origin,
and eventually return to their homewater to reproduce and die."
Historically, salmon returned in such great numbers that a member of
Lewis and Clark's expedition commented that one could walk across the
Columbia River on the backs of salmon. 12 This abundance allowed
salmon to become a central part of the tribes' diets, economies, religions
and cultures.
The value of tribal lands as a game and plant food collecting area
was limited by the rugged hills and mountains and dense forests of the
western Cascade region.13 Nasty weather often impeded travel, as did the
terrain, and heavily wooded areas supported only a sparse wildlife
population. 14 As a result, for western Washington Indians, salt and
freshwater resources were far more important for food than land
resources. 15 According to George Gibbs, the lawyer-ethnologist who
helped draft and negotiate western Washington treaties, salmon, including
steelhead where available, formed "the most important staple of
sustenance" for the tribes.16
Despite the apparent benefit of the salmon's abundance, tribes
faced a great challenge in that salmon could be taken in vast quantities, but
only during a particular and limited time period. 17 Tribes acquired food
by fishing, hunting large sea-mammals, and collecting inter-tidal marine
10 Anadromous fish are those that ascend freshwater rivers and streams to reproduce after
maturing in the ocean. See R.J. CHILDERHOSE & MARJ TRIM, PACIFIC SALMON 25-26

(1979).
" Salmon are always migrating, either in the rivers or the ocean. See John V. Byrne,
Salmon Is King-Or Is It?, 16 ENvTL. L. 343, 344 (1986); see also COHEN, supra note 9,
at 25.
12See JOURNALS OF LEWIS AND CLARK 251-53 (B. DeVoto ed., 1953); see also

http://www.onda.org/Projects/JohnDay/index.hn (last visited Feb. 27, 2001) (describing
oral and written history of Northwest pioneers and Native Americans who crossed rivers
and streams "walking on the backs of salmon"); but see http://www.saveourdams.com/
salmontimeline.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 2001) (disputing contention that Lewis and
Clark walked across the Columbia on backs of salmon).
13See LANE, supra note 2, at 3, 6.
14 See id.

15See id.
16See id.; see also Barbara Lane, Background of Treaty Making in
Western Washington,
AMERICAN INDIAN JOURNAL 3 (Apr. 1977): 2-11. One Klallam tribal member, lamenting

over the effect of the Elwha Dam on salmon migration, said, "the salmon was our food..
. the salmon was our culture. The salmon was our life." Patrick Joseph, The Battle of the
Dams, SMITHSONIAN, Nov. 1998, at 53.
17 See LANE, supra note 2, at 7.
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life.' 8 Salmon was the staple food, eaten either in fresh or cured form
year-round.' 9 When winter weather conditions generally made fishing
difficult, people lived primarily off of dried and smoked fish. 20 Tribal
members developed a number of salmon recipes and a variety of cooking
21
methods in order to avoid monotony in their diets.
As a fish staple, salmon provides essential proteins, fats, vitamins,
and minerals in the native diet. Salmon contains high levels of omega-3
fatty acids and its consumption reduces the risk of heart disease, benefits
the diabetic, reduces blood pressure, assists prevention of arthritis, and
lowers cholesterol and triglyceride levels. 22 Such fatty acids are also
important for brain development and function.2 3 The loss of salmon has
been blamed as one of the significant reasons for modem tribal health
problems, such as obesity, which leads to diabetes, as well as heart and
24
kidney disease.
Historically, salmon not only served the tribes' dietary needs, but
their abundance also. allowed the fishing trade to become the mainstay of
the tribal economy. Salmon allowed Northwest tribes to become one of
the world's few hunting and gathering societies with wealth beyond
subsistence needs. 25. Tribal. societies turned surplus food into wealthcanoes, blankets, slaves, and shell ornaments. 26 Trade beyond the local
community, even over great distances, was facilitated by food preservation
techniques, such as drying and curing, which allowed tribal members to
easily store and transport salmon. 27 Trade was also carried on for salmon
species which did not run in local streams, 28 and sometimes even for localvariety salmon because some people claimed to be able to taste differences

18 See
19 See

id.
id.

20 See id.
21

See id.

22 See U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Walla Walla District, Lower Snake River
Juvenile

Salmon Migration Feasibility Study: Tribal Circumstances and Perspective Analysis of
Impacts of the Lower Snake River Project on the Nez Perce, Yakima, Umatilla, Warm
Springs, and Shoshone Bannock Tribes 103, 127 (prepared Mar. 1999), available at
http://www.nww.usace.army.mil/html/offices/p/er/studies/isrpublic/reports/tribal/
tribaldoc.html (last visited Nov. 5, 1999) (hereinafter Tribal Circumstances).
23 See id.

See
See
26 See
27 See
28 See
24
25

id.

supra note 2, at 7.
id.
id. at 10.
id. Makah tribal members traded for sockeye, because they did not have a sockeye
fishery and valued the sockeye for flavor and fat content. See id.
LANE,
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29
between salmon of the same kind caught in different bays or streams.
Today, the tribes are unable to support themselves, as they once could
through fishing, 30 but the tribal salmon business is still a competitive
endeavor: tribes continue to fight amongst themselves over32 fishing

resources 3 1 that have fallen to less than ten percent of 1855 levels.

Fishing and salmon are also the centerpiece of tribal religion and
culture. Historically, each tribe performed some sort of first-salmon
ceremony, essentially a community- and species-based religious rite
celebrated to ensure the salmon's continued return.33 The tribes also
sought to ensure the salmon's return by designating salmon running
seasons and proscribing pollution before and during this season: no waste
could be thrown into the river, and even foul canoe water was not to be
bailed out into the river.34 Today, salmon do not return in great enough
numbers for tribes to use in traditional religious ceremonies. 35 The tribes
view restored fisheries as a vehicle for building self-esteem and reducing
the number of suicides. 36 Additionally, tribal members find fishing allows
families to share time together and work through many of their family
problems. 37 To many tribal members, the future of the salmon and Indian
culture are now walking hand in hand.38
B. The Stevens Treaties

In 1853 the Washington Territory was broken off from the Oregon
Territory and white settlers began to move west, causing friction between
Indians and settlers, and between settlers and the government. 39 Plans for
29

See id.
30 See Starla Kay Roels, Borrowing Instead of Taking: How the Seemingly Opposite
Threads of Indian Treaty Rights and Property Rights Activisim Could Intertwine to
Restore Salmon to the Rivers, 28 ENVTL. L. 375, 376 (1998).
31 See Feds Grant Snoqualmies Legal Status as a Tribe, SEATTLE TIMES, Oct. 6, 1999, at
Al (describing how the Tulalip tribes opposed the Snoqualmie tribe's efforts to secure
federal recognition, and hence inclusion within the group of tribes whose fishing rights
are guaranteed by treaty).
32 See Stephen M. Pauley, Editorial: Tribal Rights a Major Factor in Fish Recovery,
ID.
STATESMAN,
June
9,
1999,
available
in
1999
WL
15116535.
33
See LANE, supra note 2, at 9.
34 See id.
35 See Roels, supra note 30, at 376 (citing Laura Berg, Tribes Release Salmon
RestorationPlan, WANA CHINOOK TYMOO, Issues 2 and 3 1995, at 14.).
36 See Tribal Circumstances,supra note 22, at 7, 127.
31 See id.
3
1 See id. at 82, 43, 195.
39
See id. at 31, 32.
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a northern route of a Pacific Railroad also developed and with these plans
came the need to acquire tribal lands. 40 The federal government
commissioned Isaac Stevens,. the first territorial governor of Washington,
to negotiate treaties with western-Cascade tribes with the purpose of
extinguishing Indian title to land in the Washington Territory. 4 1
Stevens was a young and ambitious politician, determined to
quickly facilitate white settlement.42 His meetings with the tribes were
less "negotiation" and more of an imposition on the Indians of the treaty
provisions that Stevens had pre-drafted and brought with him to the
meetings. 43 Backed by a superior military force, Stevens arbitrarily
organized various "bands," or fragments of tribes, subordinated them
under other "tribes," and appointed "chiefs" for each tribe who were more
receptive to the whites' demands. 44 Stevens' interpreter spoke only
Chinook jargon, a trade language of limited vocabulary and simple
grammar, not a true Indian language. During negotiations, the interpreter
read the treaties in the jargon, which was then re-interpreted into the
various Indian languages by those Indians who understood the jargon.45
Steven's use of the Chinook jargon and double translation inadequately
expressed the precise legal language embodied in the treaties and resulted
in the Indians receiving third hand information, thereby increasing the
potential for confusion. Within seven months, Stevens had completed
nine treaties with roughly ten thousand Indians.47 In the end, the
Northwest tribes agreed to cede over ninety percent of their land-an
48
estimated 64 million acres.
Although the Indians agreed to part with their land, they zealously
sought to preserve their all-important fishing practices. The tribes made
clear during negotiations that protection of their fishing rights was a
condition to signing the treaties. 49 Stevens, himself, also recognized the
importance of the Indian fishery: each of the Stevens Treaties contained
provisions promising the Indians the exclusive right to fish upon their
40

See

FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN TREATIES: THE HISTORY OF A

POLITICAL ANOMALY 250 (1994).
41 See LANE, supra note 2, at 9.
42

See Michael C. Blumm, The Indian Treaty PiscaryProfit and HabitatProtection in the
Pacific Northwest: A Property Rights Approach, 69 U. COLO. L. REV. 407, 426 (1996).
43 See PRUCHA, supra note 40, at 250.
44 See LANE, supra note 2, at 10, 11.
41 See id.
447 See id. at

11.

See Blumm, supranote 42, at 426.

48 See id.
49 See id. at 429.
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reserved lands, as well as off the reservations at all "usual and accustomed
grounds and stations. . .

.,5

In reserving fishing rights and stations

without restrictions as to purpose, time, or method of taking, the tribes
intentionally retained property rights and access to traditional fishing
places regardless of land ownership. 51 As competition over the
diminishing resource increased, numerous disputes and lawsuits arose
over interpretation of the treaties' imprecise language.
C. One Hundred Years of Litigation-Recognitionof a Right to Habitat
Protection
The tribes have been embroiled in almost one hundred years of
litigation against the states and private parties in an effort to enforce their
treaty rights. In the years immediately following the signing of the
treaties, controversy over the fishery did not arise because the resource
was abundant and white settlers engaged in little fishing. 52 By the late
1880s, however, technolofical developments, like the canning process, led
many non-Indians to fish. 3 Competition between resource users grew and
the tribes began to be deprived of access to the fish they had bargained to
keep in the treaties. 54 Accordingly, the tribes turned to the courts to
enforce their treaty rights. Between 1905 and 1942, only three cases
reached the Supreme Court.55 Since 1968, however, federal and state
courts have heard numerous cases.
The cases involved disputes
concerning access to usual and accustomed stations,56 state regulation of

See id. at 430; Stevens Treaties, supra note 3. Some of these treaties use the term
"places" instead of "grounds and stations." See AMERICAN INDIAN LAW DESKBOOK 252,
SJoseph P. Mazurek ed., 2d. ed., University Press of Colorado 1998).
1See LANE, supra note 2, at 10.
52 Native Americans harvested salmon long before the "discovery" of the Pacific
Northwest. See Byrne, 16 ENVTL. L. 343, 346 (1986). Fishing was not a lucrative
business for white settlers because of low market demand for salmon due to inadequate
preservation techniques and slow transportation facilities. See United States v.
Washington (Phase 1), 384 F. Supp. 312, 352 (W.D. Wash. 1974).
53 See Charles F. Wilkinson & Daniel Connor, The Law of the Pacific Salmon Fishery:
50

Conservation and Allocation of a Transboundary Common Property Resource, 32 U.
KAN. L. REv. 17, 27 n.45 (1983) (citing L. CRESSMAN, PREHISTORY OF THE FAR WEST
1-2 (1977); COURTLAND L. SMITH, SALMON FISHERS OF THE COLUMBIA 501 (1979)).

See Blumm, supra note 42, at 434.
See, e.g., Tulee v. Washington, 315 U.S. 681 (1942); Seufert Bros. Co. v. United
States, 249 U.S. 194 (1919); United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905).
56 See Winans, 198 U.S. at
371.
54
55
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off-reservation treaty fishing rights, 57 allocation of fish between Indian
and non-Indian fishermen, and habitat protection for the fishery. In the
next section, I will discuss, although by no means exhaustively, the
development of case law concerning the treaty right of habitat protection.
1. The Winans Doctrine
The first fishing rights case to reach the Supreme Court was United
States v. Winans.58 In Winans, a private company operated a fish wheel 59
at a Yakima fishing site near Celilo Falls60 on the Columbia River, upon
the authority of a Washington State license and federal homestead patents
to adjacent shorelands. 6 1 The company argued that the treaties conferred
tribal fishing rights to the same extent that a white man would have rights
on privately owned shoreland, and that as private property owners, they
had the power to exclude Indians from the river.62
After recognizing that the canons of Indian treaty construction
required that treaties be interpreted as the tribes understood them,63 the
Court rejected the company's argument, and recognized that the treaty was

not a grant of rights to the Indians, but a grant of rights from them-a
reservation of those not granted. 64 The Court concluded that the Indians'

s See Tulee, 315 U.S. at 681; see also Puyallup Tribe v. Department of Game (Puyallup
I), 391 U.S. 392 (1968); Department of Game v. Puyallup Tribe (Puyallup II), 414 U.S.
392 (1968).
58 See Winans, 198 U.S. at 371.
59 A fish wheel is a large wheel like the stem wheel of a steamboat, with paddle blades.
The wheel is fixed in the river when the salmon are running and is turned by the current
of the river. The salmon are scooped up by the net-like paddles and dropped into a chute
in the middle of the wheel, which leads to a receiving fishbox. Brutally efficient, one
wheel in the Columbia was known to take eighty-four tons a day. See
http://www.sensato.conj1921/07salmon.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 2001).
60 Celilo Falls was one of the greatest Indian fisheries on the Columbia river. It was
drowned behind the Dalles Dam in the 1950s and the United States Army Corps of
Engineers paid almost $27 million to compensate the tribes for their lost fishing sites. See
Whitefoot v. United States, 293 F.2d 658 (Ct. Cl. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 818
(1962). The dam flooded the falls in 1956, ,and the Indian commercial catch on the
Columbia fell from over 2 million pounds, in 1955, to 58,000 pounds just two years later.
See Wilkinson & Connor, supra note 53, at 41 n.133 (citing, inter alia, Fish Comm'n of
Oregon & Washington Dep't of Fisheries, Status Report, Columbia River Fish Runs and
CommercialFisheries,1938-70, at 62 (1971)).
61See Winans, 198 U.S. at 378-79.
62 The treaty language in dispute was the words "the right of taking fish at all usual and
accustomed places in common with the citizens of the Territory." See id. at 378.
63 See id. at
380.
64 See id.
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fishing right was a property right, an easement across, or "servitude" on
private lands, indefeasible by subsequent acts of either the state or federal
government. 65 Winans' chief legacy, and a cornerstone of American
Indian law, was the Court's recognition of the servitude as a property right
restricting "every piece of land as though described therein," giving the
tribes the right to occupy and make use of their "usual and accustomed
"the contingency of future ownership" or changed
places" 66 despite
67
conditions.
The Winans case, though a major victory for the tribes, had
unfortunate long-term effects on the tribes' ability to enforce their treaty
fishing rights: the Winans' Court noted, in dicta, that states could regulate
Indian fisheries.68 However, the nature and scope of the states' regulatory
powers remained unclear and, as a result, state regulations replaced private
denial of access to fishery resources as the chief impediment to tribal
fishing. This became the basis of nearly seventy-five years of war
between the states and tribes. 69These wars were waged in the court room
and on the states' many rivers.
2. Seufert Bros. Co. and the Expansion of Tribal Property Rights
Thirteen years after Winans, in Seufert Bros. Co. v. United States,
the Supreme Court expanded its application of the treaty servitude to
unceded lands, that is, lands outside of the tribes' reservations. 70 In
Seufert Bros., a salmon packing company had excluded Yakima Indians
from Celilo Falls and claimed that Winans was inapplicable because the
tribal fishing rights servitude, as an exception to a general land grant,
could not extend to lands beyond those ceded by the Yakimas to the
federal government. 71 The Supreme Court rejected the company's
argument and relied on the canons of Indian treaty construction to find that
See Winans, 198 U.S. at 381.
66 See Stevens Treaties, supra note 3.
67
See Winans, 198 U.S. at 381.
68 Justice McKenna, writing for the Court, stated in dicta, "[n]or does [treaty right]
restrain the State unreasonably, if at all, in the regulation of the right." Id. at 384.
69 See Blurnm, supra note 42, at 444; see also Peter C. Monson, Casenote: United States
65

v. Washington (Phase II): The Indian Fishing Conflict Moves Upstream, 12 ENVT. L.
469, 477 (1982). See generally Alex Tizon, 25 Years after the Boldt Decision -the Fish
Tale that ChangedHistory, SEATrLE TIMES, Feb. 7, 1999, at Al (interview with Billy
Frank Jr., tribal activist, discussing confrontations between tribal members and state
koovemment) (hereinafter Fish Tale).
See Seufert Bros. Co. v. United States, 249 U.S. 194 (1919).
",See id. at 194.
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the Yakimas understood that the treaty would protect their fishing rights
on the disputed, though unceded land. Seufert Bros. Co. was significant
because it essentially enlarged the scope of the servitude--or, in other
words, extended tribal access rights to all customary fishing stations,
regardless of whether the tribes had ever ceded that land to the
73
government in their treaties.
3. Sohappy: The "Fair Share" Doctrine
The most controversial treaty fishing cases arose in the context of
state regulation that dealt with resource allocation and conservation.
Oregon and Washington interpreted the treaty fishing right to give the
tribe only the same rights as other citizens.
In the late 1960s, the
Yakima Indian Nation, joined by the federal government, challenged
Oregon conservation regulations which limited Columbia River harvests
above the Dalles Dam to hook-and-line fisheries, closing the river to
traditional Indian net fishing. 75 The regulations essentially placed the
entire conservation burden on the tribes, while allowing non-Indian fishing
to continue unhindered.76 In Sohappy v. Smith, Judge Robert Belloni
found that Oregon conservation measures were, among other
•
things,
77
designed to allocate salmon resources among competing harvesters.
Consequently, Belloni held that tribal fishers were entitled to a "fair share"
of the harvests and ordered Oregon to consider salmon conservation for
the native fishery on a coequal basis with conservation for other users.78
Judge Belloni's decision "revolutionized salmon management on
the Columbia River," 79 however disputes eventually arose as to what
72

See id. at 198-199.
73 See Blumm, supra note 42, at 447.

74 See Sohappy v. Smith, 302 F. Supp. 899 (D. Or. 1969); see also Department of Game
v. Puyallup Tribe, Inc., 422 P.2d 754, 757 (Wash. 1967). In Puyallup Tribe, the State of

Washington argued that the treaties gave the tribes no special rights. See Puyallup Tribe,
422 P.2d at 757. The case was ultimately reversed by the United States Supreme Court in
Department of Game v. Puyallup Tribe (Puyallup II), 414 U.S. 392 (1968).
75 See Sohappy, 302 F. Supp. at 899.
76 See id.

77 See id.
78See id.

79 See Blumm, supra note 42, at 454 (reporting that Judge Belloni
later established detailed procedural and substantive standards that the
state had to follow in achieving 'coequal' status with the native fishery.
These standards included 'meaningful' tribal participation in the
development of harvest regulations, and the 'least restrictive
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constituted a "fair share" of the harvest. Numerous tribal members 8in0
Washington were arrested for violating state harvest regulations.
Consequently, in order to enforce the principles of Sohappy, the federal
government filed suit on behalf of seven Washington State tribes."' The
case, United States v. Washington, was litigated in two parts: Phase I
determined the nature and scope of the treaty rights as they affected nonIndian fisherman.8 2 Phase II decided the allocation of hatchery fish and
whether a habitat protection right existed.83
4. Fish Wars: United States v. Washington-PhaseI
Writing the opinion in Phase I, Judge George Boldt invalidated
Washington's regulatory scheme as systematically discriminatory against
tribal fishing.84 He found that state regulation closed many historic tribal
fishing sites to net fishing while commercial net fishers were permitting to
harvest salmon elsewhere on the same fish run.8 5 Judge Boldt further
found that an allocation between native and non-native salmon harvesters
was required because the state-wide salmon harvest was insufficient to
meet all demands. 86 Interpreting the treaty language ".... in common with
.," Judge Boldt ordered the state to restrict the non-native harvest to
fifty percent of the total fish harvest,87 essentially guaranteeing the tribes
up to half of the harvest.

regulations which can be imposed [on the tribes] consistent with

assuring the necessary escapement of fish for conservation purposes.'
Citing Sohappy v. Smith, No. 68-409, slip op. at 2-3 (D. Or. Oct. 10, 1969) (unpublished

.udgment)).
See generallyCOHEN, supra note 9, at 3-17.

81See

United States v. Washington (Phase I), 384 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Wash. 1974). The
seven tribes were the Hoh, Makah, Muckleshoot, Nisqually, Puyallup, Quileute, and
Skokomish.

The tribes contended they were entitled to one-half the salmon harvests destined for
their traditional fishing grounds. See PhaseI, 384 F. Supp. at 312.
83 See United States v. Washington (Phase II), 506 F. Supp. 187 (W.D. Wash. 1980).
84 See Phase I, 384 F. Supp. at 403-404.
85 See id. at 393.
86 See id. at 386.
87 Harvestable fish are those not needed for spawning, but does not include fish caught
for subsistence or ceremonial purposes. See id. at 342. In Washington v. Washington
State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, the Supreme Court adjusted
downward to include subsistence and ceremonial catches, and fish caught on the tribes'
82

reservations. See PassengerFishing Vessel, 443 U.S. 658 (1979).
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The Ninth Circuit affirmed the Boldt decision and the Supreme
Court denied review.8 8 In the meantime, the state of Washington and its
citizens protested and resisted the decision.8 9 In two subsequent suits
challenging the decision, the Washington State Supreme Court held Judge
Boldt's allocation unconstitutional, finding that the decision discriminated
in favor of Indian and against non-Indian fishermen. 9° This decision
created a conflict between state and federal decisions and forced the
Supreme Court to consider the Boldt decision.
In Washington v. Washington State CommercialPassengerFishing
Vessel Ass'n, 91 Justice Stevens, writing for the Supreme Court, affirmed
Judge Boldt's equal sharing formula.92 In addition, the Court adopted a
needs-based "moderate-living" standard defining the scope of the treaty
fishing right, 93 stating that "Indian treaty rights to a natural resource...
secures so much as, but no more than, is necessary to provide the Indians
with a livelihood-that is to say, a moderate living." 94 Under Justice
Stevens' "moderate living" standard, the tribes' share of salmon could be
reduced below fifty percent if a tribe dwindled to only a few members or
found other sources of support to replace its fisheries.95 In the twenty
years after the Court's decision, neither of these two conditions has
96
arisen.

88 See Phase I, 520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1086 (1976).
89 See generally Fish Tale, supra note 69, at Al.
90 See, e.g., Purse Seine Vessel Owners Ass'n v. Tollefson, 571 P.2d 1373 (Wash. 1977),
vacated by, 443 U.S. 658 (1979); Puget Sound Gillnetters Ass'n v. Moos, 565 P.2d 1151
(Wash. 1977), vacated by, 443 U.S. 658 (1979).
o'See PassengerFishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 658 (upholding J. Boldt's decision).
92 See id. at 682.
9'See id. at 686.
94 id.
9'See id. at 687.
96 Besides establishing the "moderate living" standard,
the Court also reduced the tribes'
share, albeit modestly, by including on-reservation harvests as well as ceremonial and
subsistence harvests in the tribes' share. See id. at 687-88. The Court also designated the
non-native harvest as only including fish caught by Washington fishermen in either state
or federal waters. See id. This designation contributed to an international stalemate with
Canada over salmon harvest allocation, because it exempted harvests in Alaskan waters
from the equal sharing formula. See id. The stalemate was broken for a while after the
United States and Canada agreed to the Pacific Salmon Treaty in 1985. See Treaty
Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Canada
Concerning Pacific Salmon, Jan. 28, 1985, Treaty Doc. No. 99-2; see generally Thomas
C. Jensen, The United States-CanadaPacific Salmon Interception Treaty: An Historical
and Legal Overview, 16 ENvn. L. 363 (1986).
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5. The Saga Continues: UnitedStates v. Washington-PhaseII
In Phase II, Judge William Orrick, replacing retired Judge Boldt,
addressed whether artificially propagated hatchery fish were included in
the Phase I allocation, and whether the Indians' right to a share of fish
included the right to have treaty fish habitat protected from environmental
degradation. 97 Judge Orrick concluded that hatchery fish should be
included in the tribe's allocation, because, in part, under the Winans
doctrine, 98 Indian treaty rights survive changed conditions--even the
changed make-up of runs to include wild and artificial fish.99 The more
monumental aspect of Judge Orrick's decision, however, dealt with the
tribes' treaty right to habitat protection.
Judge Orrick's decision on the habitat protection issue could not
have been made more clear: "At the outset, the Court holds that implicitly
incorporated in the treaties' fishing clause is the right to have the fishery
habitat protected from man-made despoliation."' 00 The Court's rationale
behind recognition of the habitat protection right was based on the notion
that a "fundamental prerequisite to exercising the right to take fish is the
existence of fish to be taken,"'' 1 and the observation that, were the trend
of habitat destruction to continue, "the right to take fish would eventually
be reduced to the right to dip one's net into the water... and bring it out
empty."' 0 2 The significance of Judge Orrick's decision was not only that
he re-affirmed the general rule that neither party could act in a manner that
destroys the fishery, 10 3 but that the general rule applied to the particular
situation of impairment by environmental degradation, not merely by
10 5
physical device, 04 burdened access, or discriminatory regulations.
Supp. at 200.
98 See United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905).
97 See PhaseII, 506 F.

99 See Phase II, 506 F. Supp. at 200. Judge Orrick reached his conclusion that the fish
allocation included hatchery bred fish based on the Winans proposition that Indian treaty
rights survive changed conditions, and Phase I allocation of a fair share of fish to the
tribes. See id. Judge Orrick also rejected the state assertion of ownership over the
hatchery fish because the state could not own fish or wildlife freely swimming with
natural fish in state waters and because hatchery fish production was funded in part by
federal and local governments. See id. at 202.
'0oId. at 203.
101Id.
102Id.
03 See id. at 204 (citing United States v. Washington (Phase I), 384 F. Supp. 312 (W.D.
Wash. 1974)).
'04 See United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905) (concerning a Columbia River fish
wheel).
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After deciding that the tribes' treaty rights included the right to fish
habitat protection, Judge Orrick had to determine the scope of the duties
owed by the state, the federal government, and third parties to protect that
right. 0 7 The tribes argued for a "no significant deterioration" standard
that could have, theoretically, prohibited any development that affected
fishery habitat.' 0 8 The court rejected that standard, noting that the tribes'
supporting cases, interpreting goals set by Congress in various
environmental statutes, did not support such a "no significant
deterioration" standard, and because the "impliedly-reserved right may not
be broader than the minimal need which gives rise to the implied right."' 0 9
In other words, the scope of the habitat protection right could be no
110
broader than necessary to ensure the tribes' "moderate living" needs,
the standard established in PassengerFishing Vessel.'
Specifically, the treaties reserve to the tribes a sufficient quantity
of fish to satisfy their "moderate living" needs, subject to a ceiling of fifty
percent of the harvestable run." 2 While the maximum possible allocation
is set at fifty percent, the minimum may be modified in response to
changing circumstances, for instance, if the number of tribal members
dwindles or the tribe gives up fishing." 3 The correlative duty imposed
upon the federal and state governments, as well as private parties, then, is
to refrain from degrading the fish habitat to an extent that would deprive
the tribes of their "moderate living" needs.' 1 4 Essentially, Judge Orrick
created a presumption that if the tribes' allocation is set at less than fifty
percent, its "moderate living" needs are not being fully satisfied under the
treaties. "5 Essentially, if tribes prove that a defendant's actions will harm

los

See Tulee v. Washington, 315 U.S. 681 (1942) (concerning state fishing license fees).

See Washington Game Department v. Puyallup Tribe (Puyallup II), 414 U.S. 44
(1973) (concerning ban on all Indian net fishing in favor of all non-Indian hook-and-line
106

fishing).
07

' See PhaseII, 506 F. Supp. at 206.
lo' See id. at 207.

109
Id. at 208. The Court was also influenced by fear that a "no significant deterioration"
standard would have a profound effect on development and industries that harm fishe.g. timber, hydropower. See id. at 207.
"

See id.

See PassengerFishing Vessel, 443 U.S. 658 (1979).
See Phase II, 506 F. Supp. at 200 (citing Phase I, 384 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Wash.
1974)).
113 See id.
114 See id.
15 See Blumm & Swift, supra note 42.
'
112
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their fishery, and if the tribes' allocation is set at fifty percent, the
defendant will be impairing the tribes' "moderate living" needs.
Importantly, Judge Orrick also established burdens of proof. The
initial burden is on the tribes, as plaintiffs, to show that the challenged
actions "will proximately cause the fish habitat to be degraded such that
the rearing or production potential of the fish will be impaired or the size
or quality of the run will be diminished."' "16 The burden then shifts to the
state or third party to show that the tribes' needs may be satisfied by a
lesser allocation, and that any environmental degradation of the fish
habitat will not impair the tribes' "moderate living" needs.
On appeal, a three judge panel of Ninth Circuit judges affirmed
Judge Orrick's habitat protection right, but held that, instead of a
"moderate living" standard, the state and tribes were each required to take
"reasonable steps commensurate with the resources and abilities of each to
preserve and enhance the fishery." ' 1 7 Less than two years later, the Ninth
Circuit, sitting en banc, vacated its own "reasonable steps" standard and
Judge Orrick's habitat decision on abuse of discretion grounds.'
In
reviewing the propriety of declaratory relief in the fishing dispute, the
court held that the legal standards governing the state's precise treaty
obligations and duties, with respect to actions that may affect treaty
habitat, "will depend for their definition and articulation upon concrete
facts which underlie a dispute in a particular case."11 9 In several
subsequent cases that presented such "concrete facts," the courts, although
not explicitly recognizing a right to habitat protection, invariably provided
"

6

Phase II, 506 F. Supp. at 208.

117 United

States v. Washington (Phase II), 694"F.2d 1374, 1386 (9th Cir. 1983).

The Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, vacated Judge Orrick's habitat decision, but
affirmed the hatchery fish decision based on equitable factors. See United States v.
118

Washington (Phase II), 759 F.2d 1353, 1357 (1985) ("We choose to rest our decision in

this case on the proposition that issuance of the declaratory judgment on the
environmental issue is contrary to the exercise of sound judicial discretion.").
19 Id. at

1357. The court went on to state:
Legal rules of general applicability are announced when their

consequences are known and understood in the case before the court,

not when the subject parties and the court giving judgment are left to
guess at their meaning. It serves neither the needs of the parties, nor
the jurisprudence of the court, nor the interests of the public for the
judiciary to employ the declaratory judgment procedure to announce
legal rules imprecise in definition and uncertain in dimension. Precise
resolution, not general admonition, is the function of declaratory relief.
These necessary predicates for a declaratory judgment have not been

met with respect to the environmental issue in this case.

Id. at 1357.
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the tribes with injunctive relief: requiring altered dam operations, 120
enjoining dam construction, 121 delaying marina and oil port
construction, 122 preventing construction of a -pen "fish farm," 123 and
14
awarding water rights to protect treaty fisheries. 2
After years of litigation, state fishery agencies and tribes began
cooperative fisheries management efforts. Tribes began to concentrate on
legislative and regulatory processes that promised to restore salmon runs,
rather than on litigation. 11 By the mid-1990s, however, the promise of
cooperative efforts proved to be illusory and restoration efforts failed to
bring the salmon back.1 26 The Ninth Circuit indefinitely postponed
disposition of the habitat protection -issue, and even though subsequent
courts appear to imply a right to habitat protection, uncertainty still lingers
over whether the treaties provide a cause of action for tribes when
environmental degradation threatens or damages their fisheries.
IfI. WHY A DEFINITIVE RULING ON.THE HABITAT ISSUE Is NECESSARY

A. CurrentProtectionEfforts Failto ProtectTribalInterests
The value of tribal treaty harvest rights diminishes as government
restoration attempts show no signs of recovering endangered and
threatened salmon species.
In the 1990s, the Northwest states
implemented a promising restoration program under the terms of the
Northwest Power Act. 127 However, on the eve of the ESA listing of

120 See Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservation v. Callaway, No. 74-991,

slip. op. at 5 (D. Or. Feb. 13, 1976) (requiring changed dam operations).
121 See Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservation v. Alexander, 440 F.
Supp. 553 (D. Or. 1977) (enjoining dam construction).
122See Muckleshoot Indian Tribe v. Hall, 698 F. Supp. 1504 (W.D.
Wash. 1988)
(granting tribes' request for preliminary injunction of marina construction); No Oilport!
v. Carter, 520 F. Supp. 334 (W.D. Wash. 1981) (ordering trial on issue of fish habitat

degradation stemming from construction of oil port).
123See Northwest Sea Farms v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 931 F. Supp.
1515 (W.D. Wash. 1996) (upholding denial of permit for pen "fish farm").
124See Kittitas Reclamation Dist. v. Sunnyside Valley Irrigation
Dist., 752 F.2d 1456 (9th

Cir. 1985) (awarding tribes water rights to protect treaty fishery).
125 See Blumm & Swift, supra note 42, at 461.
126 See id. at 502 n.5.
127 16 U.S.C. § 839 (1994). See Northwest Power Planning Council, Amendments to the
Columbia River Basin Fish and Wilflife Program (Phase Two) 1-2 (1991) (explaining
that prior to 1991 the Northwest had a history of considering salmon issues through
various forums, including the Salmon Summit convened in 1990 by the region's
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several species of Snake River salmon, despite the expenditure of
tremendous amounts of money, 128 the chairman of the council
implementing the act recognized that the council's 1991 amendments were
"not enough."' 29 Interestingly, despite the ESA listing of the Snake
River
sockeye as endangered and the Snake River spring/summer chinook and
fall chinook as threatened 30 the National Marine Fisheries Service
(NMFS) "authorized dam-related salmon mortality of up to eighty-six
percent of juvenile sockeye and spring/summer chinook and up to ninetynine percent of juvenile fall chinook,"' 13' essentially eliminating the
opportunity for any significant tribal harvest above the dams. A program
of barging and trucking continues to be the centerpiece of federal
agencies' interim salmon restoration efforts, but the salmon-saving
32
potential of this technique is dubious.'
Today, despite these protection efforts, less than one million
salmon now return to the Columbia River Basin-a fraction of what
returns once were. 133 The total commercial catch of Columbia River

governors and Senator Mark Hatfield, that eventually led to the Northwest Power

Planning Council's regional salmon plan).
128 An estimated $3 billion has been spent by regional rate
payers and federal taxpayers
on Columbia River salmon recovery over the past twenty years. See Jim Yuskavitch,

Breaching, Drawdowns, and the Art of Salmon Recovery, TROUT, Summer 1998, at 12,
18; see also Michael C. Blumm et al., Beyond the Parity of Promise: Struggling to Save
Columbia Basin Salmon in the Mid-1990s, 27 ENVTL. L. 21, 103-04 (1997).
129 See Michael C. Blumm, Saving Idaho'sSalmon:
A History ofFailure and a Dubious
Future, 28 IDAHO L. REv. 667, 694 (1992).

See 56 Fed. Reg. at 58,619 (Nov. 20, 1991) (codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 222 (1994))
(listing Snake River sockeye as endangered); 57 Fed. Reg. at 14,653 619 (Apr. 22, 1992)
(codified at 50 C.F.R. 17.11 (1994)) (listing Snake River spring/summer chinook and fall
chinook as threatened).
130

See Michael C. Blumm et al., Saving Snake River Water and Salmon Simultaneously:
The Biological,Economic, and Legal Casefor Breaching the Lower Snake River Dams,
Lowering John Day Resevoir, and Restoring Natural River Flows, 28 ENVTL. L. 997,
131

1002 (1998) (citing National Marine Fisheries Serv., U.S. Dep't of Commerce,

Endangered Species Act--Section 7 Consultation, Biological Opinion, Reinitiation of
Consultation on 1994-1998 Operationof the FederalColumbia River Power System and
Juvenile
TransportationProgramin 1995 and Future Years (1995)).
132
See id. at 1017. '(citing THE INDEPENDENT SCIENTIFIC GROUP, RETURN TO THE RIVER:
RESTORATION OF SALMONID FISHES IN THE COLUBMIA RIVER ECOSYSTEM

(1996);

90, 328

PHILLIP R. MUNDY ET AL., TRANSPORTATION OF JUVENILE SALMONOIDS FROM
HYDROELECTRIC PROJECTS IN THE COLUMBIA RIVER BASIN: AN INDEPENDENT PEER

REVIEW, FINAL REPORT (1994) (questioning the

transportation program's efficacy and

indicating that it may be doing more harm than good).
133 See Roels, supra note 30, at 381 (citing Laura Berg,
Tribes Release Salmon
Restoration Plan, WANA CHINOOK TYMOO, Issues 2 and 3 1995, at 14.).
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Chinook in 1883 was nearly forty-three million pounds. Just over fifty
years later, in 1935 it had been reduced to eighteen million pounds, 134 and
in 1979 it was only 3.2 million pounds.' 35 Salmon runs have dwindled
from their historic numbers, estimated at between twelve million and
sixteen million fish, to now less than 900,000 fish returning to spawn in
the entire Columbia River Basin. 136 Of returning fish, the great majority
are hatchery, rather than wild fish.137 A recent study reported that Snake
River sockeye will be extinct by 2017.138 Definitive judicial recognition
of a tribal right to habitat protection would require government and private
parties to undertake the "major overhaul"'139 necessary to guarantee the
salmon's survival and to avoid the enormous financial liability that would
result if salmon were simply allowed to disappear. Recognition of a
habitat protection right would also sharpen government and private efforts
to save salmon by giving direction and instruction on how to include tribal
interests in regulatory and business decisions.
B. Provide State, PrivateParties,and Tribes with Direction
Definitive judicial recognition of the habitat protection right would
provide states, private parties, and tribes with a sense of their respective
responsibilities in the fight to save salmon. Historically, government
agencies took a "we can manage risk to salmon as we go" stance to river
resource development decisions. 140 Today, the task of government
agencies has switched from river exploitation to salmon preservation.
However, the same agencies now delay decision making in an effort to

134 See Monson, supra note 69, at 474 (citing S. Doc. No. 87, 75th Cong., 1st Sess.
20
(1937)).

135 See id. (citing OR. DEP'T OF FISH & WILDLIFE, WASH. DEP'T
OF FISHERIES, STATUS
REPORT: COLUMBIA RIVER FISH RUNS AND FISHERIES, 1957-1979 54 (May 1981)).

136 See Roels, supra note 30, at 381 (citing Pacific Northwest Regional Commission,
Columbia
Basin Salmon and Steelhead Analysis 12 (1976)).
137 See id. at n.47. See also Monson, supra note 69, at 474.
3 See Trout Unlimited, Press Release: TU Study Shows Snake River Spring Chinook
Will Be Extinct in 18 Years (Jan. 4, 2000), http:// http://www.tu.org/article list.html.
139 One judge wrote: "[T]he process [relating to hydroelectric power and fish survival]
is
seriously.., flawed because it is too heavily geared towards a status quo that has allowed

all forms of river activity to proceed in a deficit situation-that is, relatively small steps,

minor improvements and adjustments-when the situation literally cries out for a major
overhaul." Northwest Resource Info. Ctr. v. Northwest Power Planning Council, 35 F.
3d 1371, 1391 (9th Cir. 1994).
140 See Tribal Circumstances,supra note 22, at 75.
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"avoid uncertainty" associated with restoration actions.1 41 Recognition of
the habitat protection right would instill a sense of urgency within
government restoration efforts. Also, private parties would be educated
about the need to account for their treaty-habitat protection obligations
when making development decisions.
Finally, tribes would have
increased clout in opposing projects that would harm the fish habitat, and
ultimately, have recourse if the treaty fishery was degraded or destroyed.
C. Avoid Costly Litigation
If the habitat protection issue is left undecided for many more
years, and salmon runs are further degraded or become extinct, states and
private parties in the Pacific Northwest could be subject to severe financial
claims from the treaty tribes. One Northwest tribe, the Nez Perce of
Idaho, has settled suits against privately held power companies to recover
monetary damages for degraded treaty-fish habitat. 42 After several years
of litigation, the tribe eventually settled both cases, for $16.5 million
against an Idaho power company, and for $40 million against a power
company in Washington.14 3 An increasing number of Northwest tribes
have become frustrated by the ineffectiveness of government action to
save salmon,'" and appear to be preparing evidence for litigation.145 In a
226-page document that "reads more like a legal brief in a lawsuit.., than
a salmon recovery plan,"' 46 the Nez Perce, Yakima, Umatilla, Warm
Springs and Shoshone-Bannock tribes outline losses of salmon in the
Snake River system.' 4 7 Each tribe lists specific damages inflicted on its
members because of the loss of salmon since the treaties were signed,
almost 150 years ago. 14 Presumably, this figure could reach into the
billions of dollars. 149 Recognition of the habitat protection right would
141See
142 See

id.

Nez Perce v. Idaho Power Co., CV-91-0517-S-HLR (D. Idaho Mar. 21, 1997);
Nez Perce v. Washington Water Power, 847 F. Supp 791 (D. Idaho 1994).
143 Telephone interview with Doug Nash, former counsel, Nez
Perce Tribe, (Oct. 15,
1999).
'" See discussion infra, section IV. D.
145See Tribal Circumstances,supra note 22, at 75.
46
See Pauley, supra note 32.
47 See Tribal Circumstances,supra note 22, at 172.
4 See generally id.
149 The tribes estimate that they have lost billions of dollars in revenues from commercial
fisheries. See Roels, supra note 30, at 378 (citing Laura Berg, Tribes Release Salmon
Restoration Plan, WANA CHINOOK TYMOO, Issues 2 and 3 1995 at 14). In Nez Perce v.
Idaho Power Co., the tribe sought $150 million in damages. Nez Perce v. Washington
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encourage government and private parties to take measures to prevent
such costly litigation.
IV. THE SCOPE OF A HABITAT PROTECTION RIGHT: WHAT DOES
"PROTECT" REALLY MEAN?

If the courts were to definitively recognize a treaty right to habitat
protection, what responsibilities would fall on the shoulders of the federal
and state governments, as well as private parties, to honor this right? Over
the last quarter century, the courts have articulated three standards that
help define the scope of a habitat protection right: the "moderate living"
standard, the "no significant deterioration" standard, and the "reasonable
steps" standard.
A. The "ModerateLiving" Standard
The "moderate living" standard finds its underpinnings in Phase
5
/,150 and was further articulated in Passenger Fishing Vessel.1 '
Essentially the "moderate living" standard is an allocation device because
52
it divides the harvestable fish into equal native and non-native shares'
that may be reduced if tribal needs could be satisfied by a lesser amount of
fish. 53 Importantly, the "moderate living" standard establishes an implied
habitat protection right, 154 however, the standard fails to explain the scope

Water Power, 847 F. Supp. 791 (D. Idaho 1994). Commentators viewed the figure as
overinflated. See Michael Mirande, Sustainable Natural Resource Development, Legal
Dispute, and Indigenous Peoples: Problem-Solvingacross Cultures, 11 TUL. ENVTL. L.J.
33, 44 (1997). However, the figure was, arguably, an under-representation of the true
value of the lost fish when inflation is considered. Some commentators have suggested
that if the state governments simply let the salmon runs die out, the states could be
subject to severe financial claims from the tribes: "If there are no more fish runs, then the
state of Idaho will be directly responsible to make monetary compensation to those
tribes[;] . . . my sense is

... that

amount will be horrendous."

Associated Press Pol.

Serv., CongressionalChallengerRichardStallings. .., availablein 1998 WL 7451636.
50 See United States v. Washington (Phase I), 384 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Wash. 1974)
"' See PassengerFishing Vessel, 443 U.S. 658 (1979).
152 See PhaseI, 384 F. Supp. at 312.
153
See PassengerFishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 658.
154
In PhaseII, Judge Orrick found an implied treaty right to habitat protection, reasoning
that the treaty right to harvest fish was meaningless if there were no fish to be caught. See
United States v. Washington (Phase H1), 506 F. Supp. 187 (W.D. Wash. 1980). Judge
Orrick's decision, however, was later vacated for want of "concrete facts" and thus the
federal and state governments', and private parties' duty to refrain from degrading the
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of that right, 5 that is, what is required of government and private parties
to honor the habitat right.
The "moderate living" standard is promising because it would
require government and private parties to refrain from activities which
interfere with the tribes' ability to harvest sufficient fish to satisfy their
"moderate living" needs. Unfortunately, this definition suffers from
several shortcomings. Initially, state government attacked the meaning of
"moderate living" and argued that a tribal right of habitat protection based
on "moderate living" was unworkable because the tribal allocation would
have to be readjusted annually to account for varying individual incomes
and market fluctuations. 5 6 The argument failed because, as the Supreme
Court in PassengerFishing Vessel held,15 7 the "moderate living" standard
is only adjusted when tribal conditions change substantially, and the state
has the burden of proof in showing changed circumstances.
A second, more fatal weakness of the "moderate living" standard is
not that it fails to define what constitutes a "moderate living," but rather
that it fails to provide a definitive measure of the governments' and private
parties' obligation to refrain from degrading fish habitat. What exactly
must the government and individuals do to prevent habitat destruction?
Illustratively, the Phase II court allocated burdens of proof for future
litigation, but it did not clarify the respective responsibilities of the treaty
parties to avoid that litigation, 15 9 nor did it establish tribal remedies if their
"moderate living" needs are deprived.
B. The "No SignificantDeterioration" Standard
The tribes originally argued for the "no significant deterioration"
16
standard employed by courts in other areas of environmental regulation, 0
which would preclude the state from degrading the environmental quality
of the fish habitat. The "no significant deterioration" standard was

fish habitat remains unclear. See United States v. Washington (Phase II), 759 F.2d 1353,
1357 (1985).
155
See Phase II, 506 F. Supp. at 187.
156 See Brief for Appellant at 58-60, United States v. Washington (Phase II), 694 F.2d
1374 (9th Cir. 1982).
157
PassengerFishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 658.
158See Phase II, 506 F. Supp. at
208.
159
See Judith W. Constans, The EnvironmentalRight to Habitat Protection:A Sohappy
Solution-UnitedStates v. Washington, 759 F.2d 1353 (9th Cir.), Cert. Denied, 106 S. Ct.
407 (1985), 61 WASH. L. REv. 731, 755 (1986).
160
See id. at 753; PhaseII, 506 F. Supp. at 208.
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articulated by courts and adopted by Congress for the purpose of carrying
out the goals of certain environmental statutes.' 6 1 The Phase II district
court found that the scope of the state's environmental duty was defined
by the treaty fishing right rather than by unrelated Congressional
environmental standards. 62 The court concluded that the scope of the
63
fishing right was measured by the tribes' "moderate living" needs.'
On its face, the "no significant deterioration" standard appears
164
unrealistic, especially in light of the realities of modem development.
Query, however, whether the "no significant deterioration" standard
should be so readily dismissed. Application of the standard would mean,
simply, that any activity that significantly affects the habitat of fish, which
pass through usual and accustomed fishing grounds, or through
reservations, infringes on the tribes' treaty rights as interpreted in Phase
II. If an activity results in habitat degradation, causing fewer fish to be
caught by the tribes, private individuals, as well as state or federal
agencies, may be liable for the lost fish. This liability adds a new cost to
habitat-degrading development. 165
Critics might claim that a "no
significant deterioration" would be difficult to implement, 166 but
essentially such a regime has already been installed. With the listing of
several Pacific salmon species as "threatened" or "endangered,"' 67 the
161See PhaseII, 506 F. Supp. at 208 (citing Sierra Club v. Ruckleshaus, 344 F. Supp. 253
(D.D.C. 1972)). See, e.g., U.S.C. §§ 7470-7491 (1982) (Clean Air Act, U.S.C. § 7401);
United States Steel Corp. v. Train, F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1977); 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(2)
(1982) (Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251); Citizens to Preserve
Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971); 49 U.S.C. § 1653(0 (1982) (Department of
Transportation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1651); 43 U.S.C. § 1782(c) (1982) (Federal Land Policy
and Management Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1701).
162See United States v. Washington (Phase II), 506 F. Supp. 187, 203 (W.D. Wash.

1980).

163 See id. at 203.
164
See Constans, supra note 159, at 753.
165 See Monson, supra note 69, at 469,498.
166Foreseeably, a "no significant deterioration" standard would create proof problems,
clog the courts, prevent projects and development, thus creating great public resentment
and opposition, perhaps even lawlessness.
167 See 64 Fed. Reg. at 14,308 (Mar. 24, 1999) (to be codified at 50
C.F.R. pts.
223.102(a)(16), 223.102(a)(17), 223.102(a)(18), and 224.101(a)) (listing three Chinook
Evolutionary Significant Units (ESUs) in Washington and Oregon as threatened and one
Chinook Salmon ESU in Washington as endangered); 60 Fed. Reg. at 19,342 (Apr. 17,
1995) (codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 227.4(f)-(g) (1998)) (listing Snake River spring/summer
Chinook and Snake River fall Chinook as threatened); 57 Fed. Reg. at 14,653 (Apr. 22,
1992) (codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 227 (1996)) (listing Snake River spring/summer Chinook
and fall Chinook as threatened); 64 Fed. Reg. 14,508 (Mar. 25, 1999) (to be codified at
50 C.F.R. pts. 223.102(a)(12) and 223.102(a)(13)) (listing two ESUs of Chum salmon in
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federal and state governments have an obligation to prevent the salmon's
extinction. Considering that any further deterioration may in fact result in
extinction and require great compensation to tribes for their loss, federal
and state governments are required to prohibit any "significant
deterioration."
C. The "Reasonable Steps" Standard
Before Judge Orrick's habitat protection ruling was vacated by the
Ninth Circuit's en banc decision, the three-judge Ninth Circuit panel
created an alternative "reasonable steps" standard.' 68
Under the
"reasonable steps" standard, both the states and tribes must take
"reasonable steps commensurate with the resources and abilities of each to
preserve and enhance the fishery."' 69 The panel rejected the "moderate
living" standard, relying on an equal protection analogy and reasoning that
persons similarly situated should be treated alike under the law: because
the Indians, as citizens, share in the benefits of state economic
development, fairness required that they occasionally
bear "a portion of
170
the costs of non-discriminatory development."'
The "reasonable steps" standard is flawed for several reasons. The
treaty fishing right is a contract right, not a question of equal protection. 171
The tribes did not grant the government their homelands in exchange for
equal treatment, instead they granted the land after reserving their historic
fishing rights. 172 As such, the tribes "did not bargain for the benefits and
burdens of economic development.' 173 Furthermore, the "reasonable
steps" standard is overly ambiguous in that it fails to articulate standards
to direct either party's behavior-for instance, what would the tribes'

Washington and Oregon as threatened); 63 Fed. Reg. 42,587 (Aug. 10, 1998) (codified at
50 C.F.R. pt. 227.4(o) (1998)) (listing Oregon Coast ESU of Coho salmon as threatened);
64 Fed. Reg. 14,528 (Mar. 25, 1999) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 223.102(a)(19))
(listing Ozette Lake Sockeye in Washington as threatened); 56 Fed. Reg. at 58,619 (Nov.
20, 1991) (codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 222.23(a) (1998)) (listing Snake River sockeye as
endangered); 63 Fed. Reg. 13,347 (Mar. 19, 1998) (codified at 50 C.F.R. pts. 227.4(m)(n) (1998)) (listing two ESUs of Steelhead in Washington, Oregon, and California as
threatened). The NMFS' final 4(d) rule prohibiting "take" went into effect on January 8,
2001. 65 Fed. Reg. 42,422 (July 10, 2000) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 223.202).
168 See United States v. Washington (Phase II), 759 F.2d 1353, 1357 (9th Cir. 1985).
169 United States v. Washington (Phase II), 694 F.2d 1374, 1389 (9th Cir. 1983).
"7 0 Id. at 1387.
171
72

1

See Constans, supra note 160, at 756.

See id.

173 id.
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remedy be if state protection efforts were unreasonable? Finally,
advocates of the "reasonable steps" standard point to its promise in
fostering cooperative stewardship, but such promises are uninspiring as
past efforts at cooperative state and tribal fishery management have
75
produced lackluster results.
D. Alternative Proposal
Any proposed habitat protection standard should be based on the
Supreme Court's "moderate living" standard. Courts construing the
treaties have time and again reaffirmed this definition of the tribes' treaty
harvest rights. 176 The "moderate living" standard is more helpful,
however, when viewed solely as an allocation measure, rather than as a
proclamation of conservation-effort obligations to be imposed upon states,
private parties, and the tribes. Comparatively, the "no significant
deterioration" and "reasonable steps" standards are more helpful in
defining the underlying habitat protection obligations of the "moderate
living" allocation. 177 The key question then becomes, which of the two
standards should be imposed upon government and private parties?
The listing of several Pacific salmonids as "endangered" or
"threatened," has seemingly answered this question, essentially
designating "no significant deterioration" as the definition of the treaty-

174 Id.
175 Cooperative fishery management efforts between the state and tribes have proved
unsuccessful. See Blumm, supra note 42, at 460-61,461 n.260.
176 PassengerFishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 658.
177 See Blumm, supra note 42, at 492-496. Blumim discusses three sources that help
define the scope of the habitat protection, right. First is Judge Belloni's decision in
Sohappy, holding that the tribes are entitled to a "fair share" of the harvest. See id. at
493. (citing Sohappy v. Smith, 302 F. Supp. 899 (D. Or. 1969)). Second is Judge
Reinhardt's concurrence in the United States v. Washington (Phase II) panel decision,
which lays out a series of procedural and substantive protections to ensure "due
consideration" of treaty rights in the regulatory process and "full participation" of the
tribes in making decisions that affect the treaty right. See id. at 493-494. (citing United
States v. Washington (Phase 11), 694 F.2d 1389 (9th Cir. 1983)). Finally, Blumm cites a
1997 order issued by the Secretaries of the Interior and Commerce on tribal rights,
federal trust responsibilities, and the Endangered Species Act. See id. at 494-496 (citing
American Indian Tribal Rights, Federal-Tribal Trust Responsibilties, and the
EndangeredSpecies Act, U.S. Dept's Interior and Commerce, Sec. Order No. 3206 and
Appendix (June 5, 1997)). The order reiterates many of the judicially created standards
to protect the treaty fishing right, including the requirement that any restrictions on treaty
fishing be "reasonable and necessary." See id.
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habitat protection obligation under the "moderate living" standard. 178 A
"no significant deterioration" definition of the habitat protection obligation
may very well be the only effective way to inject tribal interests into
current salmon preservation efforts and ensure that the tribes' "moderate
living" needs are met.1 79 However, if the treaty-habitat protection right is
to be viewed in the context of profit h prendre law, the "reasonable steps"
standard makes a better fit.'8 0 It seems, given the status of several stocks
When a species is listed as endangered, it becomes unlawful to "take any such
species." 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B). Arguably, "no significant deterioration" is co-equal
with the definition of a "taking" that includes any activity that harms or harasses a
species, not limited to killing or capturing. See 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) (defining "take" as
"to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt
to engage in any such conduct."). Thus, under both "no significant deterioration" and a
"taking" under the ESA, the very habitat of an endangered species is to remain
undisturbed.
By contrast, when a species is listed as threatened, as many of the Pacific
salmonids have been, "takings" are not completely prohibited. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(d).
Instead, the Secretary promulgates regulations concerning what form and amount of
taking will be allowed. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(d). The Eighth Circuit has held that
regulations issued by the Secretary must provide for the conservation of threatened
species. Furthermore, the statutory definition of conservation authorizes takings only "in
the extraordinary case where population pressures within an ecosystem cannot be
otherwise relieved." Sierra Club v. Clark, 577 F. Supp. 783, 787 (D. Minn. 1984), affd
in part, rev'd in part, 755 F.2d 608, 613 (8th Cir. 1985). The ESA listing, on its face,
appears favorable to the tribes because it essentially creates a "no significant
deterioration" regime; on the other hand, however, serious questions arise as to whether
the listing diminishes or even abrogates tribal treaty fishing rights. The effect of ESA
listings on tribal treaty fishing rights is a vast topic, well beyond the scope of this note,
but it is important to recognize that judicial determination of the scope of a treaty-habitat
protection obligation will have to account for the fact that the tribal fishery habitat under
scrutiny may have already been designated "critical habitat" under the ESA. See 16
U.S.C. § 1532(5)(A) (defining "critical habitat"). See also Robert J. Miller, Speaking
178

with Forked Tongues: Indian Treaties, Salmon, and the EndangeredSpecies Act, 70 OR.

L. REV. 543 (1991) (discussing potential effects of ESA listing of salmon on tribal treaty
fisheries).
179 Comparatively, the effects that the ESA listings will have on identified salmonhabitat-destroying activities in the Pacific Northwest are now just matters of speculation.
See Lynda V. Mapes, Puget Sound Salmon on the Brink, SEATTLE TIMES, Mar. 14, 1999,
at A13. Arguably, as government officials and interested private party-stakeholders
gather to generate salmon-saving solutions, tribal interests will continue to be overlooked
in favor of more influential stakeholders, such as the hydroelectric power and forestry
industries, so long as the obligation to honor tribal rights to fish-habitat protection is
defined any less than "no significant deterioration." See Miller, supra note 178, for
implications of ESA listing in context of tribal treaty fishing rights.
80

Under profit ti prendre law, the owner of the servient estate may not unreasonably

interfere with the beneficiary's enjoyment of the profit. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
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of Pacific salmonids as "threatened" or "endangered," that "reasonable
steps" means, in fact, no less than "no significant deterioration."'' 81 Any
less-stringent definition of the treaty protection obligation may doom the
salmon to extinction. Viewed in this way, the habitat-protection right may
be explained by profit i prendre law and extend the fullest protection to
the tribes' treaty habitat.
Unfortunately, the courts have eschewed the "no significant
deterioration" standard out of fear of imposing a "wilderness servitude" on
development. 182 Imposition of a such a standard does not mean that
salmon habitat must be restored to nineteenth century conditions or that
development must halt in the name of "King" Salmon, 18 3 but creation of a
"no significant deterioration" regime will taste like bad medicine: The
standard is just what the doctor ordered, in a sense, because any further
degradation may mean the salmon's extinction, but imposing the standard
will "taste bad" to the Northwest economy. 1 4 The "no significant
deterioration" standard simply means that the Northwest's most creative
and cooperative problem solvers, representing stakeholders from
government, business and industry, sport fishers, and tribes must come
together to develop a plan of action that fosters reasonable growth in a

SERVITUDES §4.9 (1998).
In this way, profit law's prohibition of
"unreasonable interference" is co-equal with the Ninth Circuit panel's "reasonable steps"
definition of the habitat protection obligation under the "moderate living" allocation
standard. See Blumm, supra note 42, at 491-92.
181Arguably, servient tenants' obligation to refrain from "unreasonable interference" of
profit holders' ability to exercise their rights, in the context of nearly extinct salmon,
means that the government and private parties cannot engage in activity that
"significantly deteriorates" treaty-habitat. Any significant deterioration, actively imposed
or allowed to occur, would be "unreasonable." See Blumm, supra note 42, at 491-92.
182 See, e.g., Nez Perce Tribe v. Idaho Power Co., 847 F. Supp.
791, 813 (D. Idaho
1994).
183 The courts have repeatedly stated that the tribes are not
entitled to fisheries restored to
treaty-time conditions, but rather conditions which ensure the tribes' "moderate living"
needs are met. See PassengerFishing Vessel, 443 U.S. 658 (1979); United States v.
Washington (Phase II), 759 F.2d 1353, 1357 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc); United States v.
Washington (Phase I), 694 F.2d 1374 (9th Cir. 1983); United States v. Washington
(Phase 11), 506 F. Supp. 187 (W.D. Wash. 1980).
184 Comparitively, the ESA listing of several Pacific salmonids
as "endangered" or
"threatened" could have a substantial impact on many of the major economic bases of the
Northwest including logging, agriculture, power generation, and fishing to an extent that
dwarfs the impacts that the listing of the spotted owl had on the economy of the
Northwest. See Larry J. Bradfish, Recent Development in Listing Decisions under the
EndangeredSpecies Act and Their Impact on Salmonoids in the Northwest, 3 HASTINGS
W.-N.W. J. ENvTL. L. & POL'Y 77 (1995).
PROPERTY:
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way that incorporates habitat restoration and ensures tribal "moderate
living" needs.'85
About now, the skeptics are asking what, in fact, should be the
scope of a treaty-habitat protection right, and how would such a standard
be implemented and enforced. To highlight, the tribes' treaty-habitat
protection right should, and must be based on the "moderate living"
allocation standard, 186 and defined in scope by a "no significant
deterioration" standard. Implementation of any standard begins when
states, as they currently are required to, take treaty rights into
consideration when making regulatory decisions. 8 7 If the state failed to
adequately consider tribal interests in making regulatory decisions that
negatively impacted tribal fisheries, or allowed private development that
intentionally or negligently destroys treaty fish, the tribes should have the
ability to sue for money damages in federal district court.'8 8
18' Of note, any proposed definition of the treaty-habitat protection obligation will also
have to confront the management complexities compounded by the migration of salmon
between Canadian and United States waters. "Interception by Canadian fishers of salmon
spawning in United States waters but migrating beyond United States jurisdiction into
Canadian waters, and vice versa, has been a major problem for United States and
Canadian officials during most of this century." John V. Byrne, Salmon Is King-Or Is
It?, 16 ENVTL. L. 343, 350 (1986). For background on U.S.-Canada relations in the
fishing arena, see generally Thomas C. Jensen, The United States-CanadaPacific Salmon
Interception Treaty: An Historicaland Legal Overview, 16 ENVTL. L. 363 (1986).
186 See PassengerFishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 658.
187 See Sohappy v. Smith, 302 F. Supp. 899 (D. Or. 1969).
188 Federal District courts have original jurisdiction in "all civil actions, brought by any
Indian tribe or band with a governing body duly recognized by the Secretary of the
Interior, wherein the matter in controversy arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties
of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1362 (2001). See Oneida Indian Nation v. County of
Oneida, 414 U.S. 661 (1974) (holding that 28 U.S.C. § 1362 creates federal jurisdiction
when an Indian tribe brings a tort action alleging damage to an interest created by treaty
or other federal law); Pueblo Isleta ex rel. Lucero v. Universal Constructors Inc., 570
F.2d 300, 302 (10th Cir. 1978) (holding district court has jurisdiction over action to
recover damages for injury to tribal property); Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Burgett Floral
Co., 503 F.2d 336 (10th Cir. 1974) (citing Oneida and applying it against private
defendants); Nez Perce Tribe v. Idaho Power Co., 847 F. Supp. 791 (D. Idaho 1997)
(recognizing jurisdiction to hear action alleging damages to treaty fishing rights). But see
Chilkat Indian Village v. Johnson, 870 F.2d 1469 (9th Cir. 1989) (denying jurisdiction in
action for possession of carved wooden posts and rain screen unprotected by federal law).
Even if a federal district court has subject matter jurisdiction over a tribe's claim
against a private party, the claim may exceed the statute of limitations for such claims. In
1982, the Indian Claims Limitation Act extended the statute of limitations for pre-1966
Indian damage claims against private parties for monetary damages, which was to expire
on December 31, 1982. 28 U.S.C. § 2145. Under the Act, tribes were allowed to submit
potential pre-1966 claims to the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) until December 20, 1992.
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V. THE REMEDY IF HABITAT PROTECTION RIGHTS ARE INFRINGED:
MONEY DAMAGES

A. Why Money Damages?

1. Injunctive Relief Is an Inadequate Remedy
The tribes have successfully obtained injunctive relief to prevent
salmon habitat destruction in a number of cases. These cases have
enabled tribes to alter dam operations,' 89 enjoin dam construction, 190
acquire water rights to protect treaty fisheries,' 9 1 delay marina and oil port
construction, 192 and prevent construction of a pen "fish farm."' 193 Despite
the tribes' successes, injunctive relief is an inadequate remedy when dam
building, logging, farming, mining, industry, and residential development
have forever destroyed treaty-fish, habitat, and traditional fishing
grounds. 194 Money damages, unlike injunctive relief, would provide
compensation for lost fishery resources and provide stronger incentive for
states and private parties to minimize damage to treaty fish.
2. Provide Tribes with Funds to Restore Depleted Fisheries
The ability to bring claims for money damages is really just a
means to an end: "[t]ribal people want the fish and ecosystem restored,

The BIA would then determine which claims the Department of Justice should pursue.
Ostensibly, Northwest tribes could still'bring claims for money damages against private
parties who degrade treaty fish habitat, however they could not seek money damages for
pre- 1966 claims.
9See Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservation v. Callaway, Civ. No. 72211, slip. op. at 5 (D. Or. Aug. 17, 1973) (requiring changed dam operations).
190 See Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservation v. Alexander, 440 F.
Supp. 553, 556 (D. Or. 1977) (enjoining dam construction).
191See Kittitas Reclamation Dist. v. Sunnyside Valley Irrigation Dist., No. 80-35-5, slip.
ox at 5 (9th Cir. Sept. 10, 1982) (awarding tribes water rights to protect treaty fishery).
See Muckleshoot Indian Tribe v. Hall, 698 F. Supp. 1504 (W.D. Wash.
1988)
(granting tribes' request for preliminary injunction of marina construction). See also No
Oilport! v. Carter, 520 F. Supp. 334 (W.D. Wash. 1981) (ordering trial on issue of fish
habitat degradation stemming from construction of oil port).
193 Northwest Sea Farms, Inc. v. United States Army Corps of Engineers,
931 F. Supp.
1515, 1518 (W.D. Wash. 1996) (upholding denial of permit for pen "fish farm").
194 See COHEN, supra note 9, at xi-xii. See also CHILDERHOSE & TRIM, supra note 10, at
49-76 for a detailed explanation of environmental threats to the anadromous fishery.

812

WM. & MARY ENVTL. L.

& POL'Y REV.

[Vol. 25:783

not simply dollars."' 195 Monetary compensation works like a double-edged
sword: compensation would increase tribal wealth and has the potential
for salmon habitat restoration, but if awarded in an unstructured fashion,
the money has the potential to be squandered and do nothing to secure the
future of the salmon, or the tribes' ability to continue harvesting fish. The
tribes should not be expected to endure years of litigation to recover
money to "buy a can of salmon off the shelf at Albertsons."' 96 Treaty
tribes should be entitled to monetary compensation when their fishing
rights have been deprived by habitat destruction, but payments should be
structured in a way to ensure that funds go toward restoring depleted
fisheries.
Unstructured, cash-in-hand payment of compensation to tribes on a
per-capita basis creates great risks. Large cash payments would be a
windfall to tribal members who are often terribly poor. The risk of
squandering is great, especially for those tribal members very
inexperienced in the handling of cash.' 97 Cash-in-hand payments to tribal
members might provide a temporary boost to the tribal economy, but in
the long run, little or no money goes toward salmon habitat restoration or
Alternatively, monetary
to programs to rebuild tribal culture.' 98
compensation, structured within long-term, trust-based payment schemes,
or specifically designated for salmon habitat restoration or tribal culture
building projects would be much more constructive. Illustratively, the
Nez Perce tribe's settlement with Idaho Power Company dedicated a
certain percentage of money to fisheries restoration efforts designed to
address the impacts the Hell's Canyon dams have had upon the
fisheries.' 99 Money damages would not only promise to assist tribal
efforts to restore salmon habitat, but might also encourage efforts to
prevent salmon habitat destruction from occurring at all.

195 See Roels, supra note 30, at 405 (quoting Ted Strong, Executive Director of the

Colubmia River Inter-Tribal Fish Commission).
'96

Representative Helen Chenoweth (R-Idaho) is quoted as saying "How can I [take
off the shelf at

salmon's endangered status seriously] when you can buy a can of salmon

Albertsons?"

See Robert L. Peters,

DEFENDERS,

Winter 1995/96, at 24 (satirizing

Chenoweth's comments in an editorial cartoon).
Representative
97

See Mirande, supra note 149, 57.
198 See id. at 57 (equating cash settlements with traditional money-for-tribal heritage
1

exchanges).
'99 See id. at 51-52.
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3. Encourage Preventative Measures
In the 1990s, as salmon stocks became threatened and endangered,
salmon recovery projects became a focus for feasibility analysis. 2°
Conservation managers asserted the need to be highly certain of salmon
results before taking action; in other words, decision-making officials
were much more risk averse with respect to uncertainty when the issue
was saving salmon, than when the issue was developing rivers for other
uses.20 1 If Pacific salmon become extinct, however, state governments
could be liable to the tribes for a tremendous amount of money. 2 2 Faced
with the risk of incurring such horrendous monetary liability, state
politicians and private parties would have incentive to take preventative
rather than delayed prescriptive action. 20 3 Other salmon-saving solutions,
such as dam removal, habitat restoration,
and stricter zoning ordinances
20 4
comparison.
in
cheaper
much
could be
B. Are Tribes Entitled to Money Damages for Treaty-Fish Habitat
Destruction?
Although the nature and scope of treaty rights are not to be limited
by Anglo-American common law regarding property, 205 courts have found
common law property concepts instructive and have employed them to
protect tribal fishing rights. 206 The key to recognizing the tribes' right to
bring claims for money damages for treaty-fish habitat destruction is to

200

201
202

See Tribal Circumstances,supra note 22, at 75.
See id.
When the U.S. Supreme Court upheld PhaseI in Passenger Fishing Vessel, making

tribal pursuit of the Phase H habitat protection right sure to follow, Washington State
Governor Dixie Lee Ray expressed the fear that "were all the claims now identified by
various Indian tribes to be granted, it would totally break the bank so far as the economy

of the state and nation is concerned."

See Cohen, supra note 9, at 139 (citing Paul

Andrews, EnvironmentalImpacts: Larger Dispute on Fish-Run Impacts ahead as Phase
II of Boldt Ruling, SEATTLE TIMEs, July 4, 1979, at A 14).
203 See CongressionalChallengerRichardStallings, supra note 149.

See Blumm, supra note 131, at 1053 (advocating dam removal on Snake River and
warning that tribal damages claims could be quite large).
205 See Passenger Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 684; Grand Traverse Band of Chippewa
Indians v. Director, Michigan Dep't of Nat'l Resources, 971 F. Supp. 282, 289 (W.D.
204

Mich. 1995). See also Allen H. Sanders, DamagingIndian Treaty Fisheries:A Violation
of TribalPropertyRights?, 17 PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REv. 153, 156 (1996).

See United States v. Taylor, 13 P. 333 (Wash. Terr. 1887); United States v. Winans,
198 U.S. 371 (1905).
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understand that the treaties reserve enforceable property rights.2 °7 The
tribes hold property rights to their "usual and accustomed places," for
which they are entitled compensation if these rights "in land" are
destroyed; 0 8 however, the more complicated issue involves their treatyreserved property rights to fish-not the opportunity to try and catch fish,
but the right to take a share of the harvestable fish that would be available
absent human interference. 20 9 In this sense, the tribes' right to harvest fish
imposes a "servitude" on land,210 otherwise known as a '.profit a prendre,"
or profit, that requires compensation whenever the right to harvest fish is
interfered with by habitat destruction.
1. The Treaty Right as a Servitude-the Profit a Prendre
It is a basic legal tenet that "wild animals such as fish are the
property of no one until reduced to possession", 211 and that "the res is the
212
property right consisting of the opportunity to take the fish.,
Accordingly, tribal treaty fishing rights are a property right to harvest fish,
a right that many courts have construed as a "servitude" or "right in
land. 213 The tribes' treaty right to harvest fish is fairly characterized as a
form of a servitude known as a "profit a prendre" ("profit") in that the
treaty right, similar to an easement,214 confers the right to enter and use the

See PassengerFishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 673 n.20.
See Blumm, supra note 42, at 409, 488.
209 See PassengerFishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 678.
210 See Winans, 198 U.S. at 381-382.
211 See Roels, supra note 30, at 385 n.69.
212 See id.
213 The Restatement (Third) of Property states that servitudes now refers to all "profit h
prendre"simply as "profit." See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 1.2
(1998). The right to hunt and fish upon another's land has commonly been recognized as
a "profit." See Figliuzzi v. Carcajou Shooting Club, 516 N.W.2d 410 (Wis. 1994);
Reeves v. Alabama 514 So. 2d 917 (Ala. 1987) (holding right to hunt on land of another
is a profit i prendre);Nelson v. State, 883 S.W.2d 839 (Ark. 1994) (holding right to hunt
and fish is a profit a prendre); Hagan v. Delaware Anglers', 655 A.2d 292 (Del. Ch.
1994) (holding reservation of fishing rights created a profit in gross); Merriam v. First
Nat'l Bank, 587 So. 2d 584 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (characterizing the right to hunt or
fish as a profit a prendre); State v. Davids, 534 N.W.2d 70 (Wis. 1995) (holding tribal
right to hunt and fish is considered a profit ii prendre and an interest in real property);
Van Camp v. Menominee Enterprises, 228 N.W.2d 664 (Wis. 1975) (holding a right to
hunt and fish is a profit a prendre, an interest in real property).
214 The RESTATEMENT THIRD OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 1.2 defines
an easement as a
"nonpossessory right to enter and use land in the possession of another [that] obligates
the possessor not to interfere with the uses authorized by the easement."
207
208
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land in possession of another for the purpose of removing, among other
215
things, fish from the water.
Tribal treaties meet all the formal requirements for creation of an
appurtenant servitude-a profit ii prendre.2 16 Tribal treaties comply with
the formalities required for creation of a servitude because the parties
expressed their intent to reserve tribal fisheries in written and signed
instruments. 217 Furthermore, the treaty fishing right to take resources from
another's land inherently touches and concerns the retained land, or
servient tenament, and benefits the tribes' reservations, or dominant
tenament, by achieving the reservations' purpose-to enable the tribes to
"maintain an economically and culturally viable lifestyle." 2 18 The tribes'
appurtenant servitude operates to allow tribal use and restrain the servient
estate holder, federal and state governments, as well as private parties,
from using the servient estate as would a holder of property in fee simple,
219
even if the servient estate is not adjacent to the dominant estate.
The courts have consistently recognized the right to hunt and fish
upon another's land as a profit t prendre. In one seminal case, Figliuzzi
v. Carcajou Shooting Club of Lake Koshkonong,22 1 the Wisconsin
Supreme Court examined whether the Club's hunting rights on land
owned by the Figliuzzis constituted an easement. The court noted that
215 See Figliuzzi v. Carcajou Shooting Club, 516 N.W.2d 410 (Wis. 1994) ("We can find
no distinction between easements and profits relevant to recording the property interest..
. numerous courts have blurred the distinction between the two.").
216 See Gerry D. Meyers, United States v. Washington (PhaseII) Revisited:
Establishing
an Environmental Servitude Protecting Treaty FishingRights, 67 OR. L. REv. 771, 78384,
217 787 (1988) (equating profits i prendrewith easements).
See id. at 787.
218 See id.

219

See id. at 786.
220 See Kennedy v. Becker, 241 U.S. 556, 562 (1916) ("We assume that [the Seneca]
retained an easement [to hunt and fish,] or a profit a prendre, to the extent defined [in the
treaty of the Big Tree of 1797]"); Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa
Indians v. Voigt, 700 F.2d 341, 352 (7th Cir. 1983) (describing treaty fishing rights as
"similar to aprofit tprendre");United States v. Finch, 548 F.2d 822, 833 (9th Cir. 1976)
(Judge (now Justice) Kennedy recognizing that the treaty fishing right could be
characterized as a profit ehprendre); Van Camp v. Menonimee Enterprises, Inc., 228
N.W.2d 664, 669-70 (Wis. 1975) (Supreme Court of Wisconsin recognizing a right to
hunt and fish derived from a treaty as a profit at prendre and citing 1 THOMPSON, REAL
PROPERTY (1964 Replacement) 513, sec. 135. and 3 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (3d ed.),
pp. 427, 428, sec. 839.); Grand Traverse Band of Chippewa and Ottawa Indians v.
Director, Michigan Dep't of Natural Resources, 971 F. Supp. 282, 288 (W.D. Mich.
1995) (discussing that treaty rights to fish are profits at prendre,constitutionally protected
property rights).
See Figliuzzi v. Carcajou Shooting Club, 516 N.W.2d 410 (Wis. 1994).

WM. &

MARY ENvTL. L. & POL'Y REV.

[Vol. 25:783

hunting rights on another's land are regarded as a profit a prendre, which
courts do not generally distinguish from easements.222 The Figliuzzi's
proposed development of their land would have destroyed the Club's
easement, so the Court prohibited the development.223 Treaty fishing
rights do not significantly differ from the non-treaty hunting rights at stake
in Figliuzzi. Like non-treaty hunters, treaty fishers have the right to
remove a product from property, namely a river, that does not belong to
them. Therefore, treaty fishing rights, under the doctrine of profit ct
prendre,could be considered the same as an easement.
2. The Remedy for Damages to Profits: Monetary Relief
Historically, one stick in the proverbial bundle of property rights is
the right not to have the property itself degraded or destroyed.224 Under
servitude law, when the owner of the servient estate unreasonably
interferes with the beneficiary's enjoyment of the profit, 225 the beneficiary
is entitled to compensation.226 When federal and state governments and
private parties degrade fish habitat, they are "unreasonably interfer[ing]"
222

See id. at 417.
See id. at 417-418.
224 See generally Roels, supra note 30, at 393-95.
225 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES
223

§ 4.9 (1998); 8 THOMPSON ON

PROPERTY § 65 (David A. Thompson ed., 1994).
REAL
226
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 8.2 (1998). Traditional remedies
appropriate for enforcement of profits include injunctions and damages. See § 8.3 cmt. b.
Injunctions are normally available to redress violations of easements and restrictive
covenants without proof of irreparable injury or a showing that a judgment for damages
would be inadequate. See id. Damages, on the other hand, are available to remedy
excessive use or unauthorized use of an easement-generally a trespass-for which
damages or injunctive relief are normally granted; damages are also available for
obstruction of the easement; damages and injunctions requiring removal of the
obstruction, restoration of the easement, and prohibiting future obstruction are normally
appropriate. See id. A judgment for money damages ordinarily provides an adequate
remedy for a claim for maintenance, repair, or replacement expenses. See id. Damages
commonly accompany injunctions in easement cases. This is significant in that tribes
could win both money damages and require state and private parties to restore the salmon
runs.
In determining the appropriate remedy, courts should take account of
the purpose of the servitude arrangement and its continued utility as
well as the relative equities of the parties. A servitude may have utility
beyond its benefit to the immediate parties, suggesting that it should be
enforced with a coercive remedy. If an injunction will create significant externalities, monetary relief alone may be more appropriate.
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with the tribes' ability to harvest a sufficient number of fish to satisfy their
"moderate living" needs. 227
Foresceably, application of the no
"unreasonable interference" to the "moderate living" standard would
limit
or prohibit development activities which threaten or destroy a treatyreserved fish run.22' Essentially, the tribes' treaty-reserved right to harvest
fish is a property right that cannot be destroyed by either the government
or private parties without compensation. 229 The exercise of the treaty
fishing right requires fish for the catching and the destruction of the fish
prevents the tribes from using and enjoying its property rights.
There is great judicial concern that recognition of a tribal right to
bring claims for money damages if treaty-fish habitat is destroyed would
establish a wilderness servitude and prevent development.
Pacific
Northwest fish do not benefit from 1855 conditions, and the tribes do not
argue for habitat restoration to those conditions. 2 31 In reality, current
conditions threaten several salmon runs with extinction.2 a2 The common
law scope of protection afforded profits ii prendre of "no unreasonable
interference" would not prevent all development, only activities that
substantially impaired the treaty tribes ability to harvest fish sufficient to
satisfy their "moderate living" needs. 233 Accordingly, when state and
federal governments contribute to and cause fish declines,23 4 as guarantors
of the tribes' treaty right to fish, they may be liable to compensate the

227

See Blumm, supra note 42, at 492.
Under profit law, these habitat-degrading developments would be deemed to
"unreasonably interfere" with the tribes' ability to harvest fish sufficient
to meet their
"moderate living" needs. See id. at 492 n.431 (citing several fish allocation
cases in
which both native and non-native fisheries were regulated to ensure fish preservation for
the proposition that development projects which damage fish habitat should be treated no
differently). See, e.g., Puyallup Tribe v. Department of Game, 433 U.S. 165, 175-177
(1977) (Puyallup III) (discussing that tribal fishing subject to conservation regulations);
United States v. Oregon, 657 F.2d 1009 (9th Cir. 1982) (upholding an injunction against
a tribal fishery in the interest of conservation); Hoh Indian Tribe v. Baldridge, 522 F.
Supp. 683 (W.D. Wash. 1981); Confederated Tribes v. Kreps, Civ. No. 79-541 (D. Or.
Sept. 10, 1979) (finding ocean harvest subject to conservation regulations).
229
See Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 413 (1968); Muckleshoot
Indian
Tribe v. Hall, 698 F. Supp. 1504, 1512 (D. Or. 1988).
23 0 See United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394, 1411 (9th Cir. 1983).
231 See Blumm, supra note 42, at 490-1.
232 See Bradfish, supranote 184, at 86-90.
233 See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 4.9 (1998).
234 See Roels, supra note 30, at 378 (describing how
federal and state governments have
caused and/or contributed to fish declines).
228
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tribes under the Fifth Amendment takings clause. 235 Furthermore, because
the treaties' obligations apply not only to the United States, but also to its
grantees, 236 private parties may also be liable for money damages if they
degrade tribal treaty fisheries.
a. Government Liability
i. Fifth Amendment Takings Claim
As property rights, treaty-reserved harvest rights are protected by
the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 237 The exercise of
the tribes' fishing right requires fish to harvest, and so the elimination of
the fish through degradation of habitat denies the tribes the ability to use
their property rights and enjoy ownership benefits. 238 Accordingly, loss of
the tribes' ability to exercise treaty fishing rights, through fish habitat
degradation, could give rise to a claim for compensation under the Fifth
Amendment.239
Treaty rights were first construed as property rights in Menominee
Tribe v. United States.240 In Menominee, the tribe sued the federal
government for damages for lost reservation-based treaty hunting and
fishing rights.241 In recognizing the tribe's hunting and fishing rights as a
treaty-secured property right, the Court held that only Congress has the
power to abrogate treaty rights, and that abrogation requires
242
Ultimately, the Court found that Congress, in passing
compensation.

235

U.S. CONST. amend. V.; see generally Roels, supra note 30 (arguing treaty rights to

engage in fishing, rather than in fish themselves, are a compensable Fifth Amendment
property right).
36 See United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381-82 (1905).
237 See Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 412 (1968); see also
Muckleshoot Indian Tribe v. Hall, 698 F. Supp. 1504, 1510, 1512 (W.D. Wash. 1988)
(citing Menominee for contruing treaty rights as Fifth Amendment property rights). The
Fifth Amendment provides, in part, "nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
238 See Roels, supra note 30, at 383.
239 See id.
240 See Menominee Tribe of Indians, 391 U.S. 404 (1968).
241 See id. at 412.
242 See id. (holding that a treaty right cannot be abrogated-in whole or part-without
express and specific congressional action).
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the Menominee Termination Act of 1954,243 had not abrogated tribal
treaty rights and that the tribe was entitled to compensation.244
In the Pacific Northwest, Congress has not expressly or
specifically abrogated tribal treaty fishing rights,245 but governmental
action has substantially interfered with the tribes' ability to exercise their
treaty fishing rights at a level to satisfy their "moderate living" needs.246
One commentator suggests that a tribal takings claim could be made
alleging either a direct taking, analogizing government interference with
the tribes' beneficial ownership of the right to harvest fish with
government takings of land, or alternatively, a regulatory taking, occurring
when government action or inaction under statutes and regulations impact
fish population and habitat, and thus tribal fishing.247 If a tribe were to
successfully bring either form of takings claim, the United States would
owe compensation, potentially an enormous amount of money, to treaty
tribes.248
One difficulty with seeking compensation for damaged treaty
fisheries under a Fifth Amendment takings claim is that compensation
might actually abrogate treaty-fishing rights. In United States v. Sioux
Nation of Indians the United States Supreme Court held that a taking had
occurred and ordered the federal government to compensate the tribe.2 49
The compensation payment was deemed to extinguish the tribe's claim to
the Black Hills. 250 Today, one tribe refuses to accept the compensation
payment, claiming that it wanted the land restored rather than a damage
award; as a result, the tribe now has neither land nor money.25 ' If the
Northwest tribes were to bring a takings claim against the government, to
243

See Menominee Indian Termination Act of 1954, 25 U.S.C. §§ 891-902 (1994).

244

See id.

245
246

See Roels, supra note 30, at 380.

See Mary Christina Wood, Indian Land and the Promise of Native Sovereignty: The
Trust Doctrine Revisited, 1994 UTAH L. REv. 1471, 1492-93 (citing a multitude of
federal agencies responsible for the present salmon crisis in the Columbia River Basin);
see also Roels, supra note 30, at 380-382, 390 (discussing environmental degradation
caused by government dam licensing, construction, and operation and inability of the

tribes to satisfy their needs through fishing).
247 See Roels, supra note 30, at 389-403.
248 See id. at 407.
249 See United States v. Sioux Nation of

Indians, 448 U.S. 371 (1980); see Roels, supra

note 30, at 406.

250 See generally Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371.
251 See Oglala Sioux Tribe v. United States, 650 F.2d 140 (8th Cir. 1981) (finding that the

federal court lacked jurisdiction to hear a Fifth Amendment takings suit filed by the

Oglala Sioux because the Tribe's sole remedy had been established as monetary damages
through the Indian Claims Commission).
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avoid a Black Hills result, they would have to ensure that any
compensation25 payment was structured in a way that does not extinguish
treaty rights.
ii. Claims Under Federal Trust Responsibility
Another important consideration in analyzing government liability
for degradation of tribal treaty-habitat is the Indian trust doctrine. The
Indian trust doctrine imposes a strict fiduciary obligation on the federal
government in its dealings with the tribes, 253 requires the government to
assist in the protection of tribal property and resources, and provides a
basis for compensation or equitable relief when the government has
breached its duty and wronged tribal people.254 Nearly all tribal
reservation lands are held in trust by the United States, with a particular
tribe as the beneficiary, 255 but as seen with the Northwest tribes' treatyreserved fishing rights, treaty resources may be subject to off-reservation
harm and require federal intervention. 256 Curiously, however, the federal
government is responsible for many of the worst threats to tribal salmon
through its own activities.257
Historically, the trust doctrine has been invoked by Congress and
federal agencies as a source of plenary power to control activities on tribal
lands in a "guardian-ward" sense,258 rather than as a doctrine of
252 See Rods, supra note 30, at 406 (suggesting ways in which a tribal takings claim
could be made and compensation structured without abrogating treaty rights).
253 A leading Indian trust case is Seminole Nation v. United States, where the United
States Supreme Court stated: "Under a humane and self-imposed policy. .. [the federal
government] has charged itself with moral obligations of the highest responsibility and
trust. Its conduct, as disclosed in the acts of those who represent it in dealings with the
Indians, should therefore be judged by the most exacting fiduciary standards." Seminole
Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 296-97 (1942). Trust responsibility may arise
between a tribe and the federal government in a number of ways: treaties and agreements;
the United States Constitution; judicial decisions; federal statutes; international law. See
GILBERT L. HALL, DUTY OF PROTECTION: THE FEDERAL-INDIAN TRUST RELATIONSHIP 3
(1979). Many Northwest tribes enjoy their trust relationship with the federal government
through the Stevens Treaties.
254 See Hall, supra note 253, at 3.
255 See Wood, supra note 246, at 1478, 1495 (citing Milner S. Ball, Constitution, Court,
Indian Tribes, 1987 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 3, 65).
256 See id. at 1489.
257 See id. at 1492-93 (citing a multitude of federal agencies responsible for the present
salmon crisis in the Columbia River Basin).
258 The notion of the trust doctrine as a "guardian-ward" model derives from United
States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 383-384 (1886)
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governmental restraint to protect tribal natural resources.2 " Columbia
River Basin tribes have urged federal agencies to fulfill their trust
responsibility by restoring salmon populations, controlling water
pollution, and conserving water in streams.26° The courts' use of the trust
doctrine to restrain Congress in the area of Indian affairs has been virtually
nonexistent, 26 1 but various tribes have relied upon the trust responsibility
to successfully secure equitable relief and enjoin federal agency action that
threatens the use of2 62Indian land and corollary treaty resources, such as
treaty fishing rights.
(These Indian tribes are the wards of the nation. They are communities
dependent on the United States ....
[flrom their very weakness and
helplessness, so largely due to the course of dealing of the Federal
Government with them and the treaties in which it has been promised,
there arises the duty of protection, and with it the power.).
259
See Wood, supra note 246, at 1506-08.
260 See id. at 1506 (citing Water Spreading Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight
and Investigations of the House Comm. on NaturalResources, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 60,
62-63 (1994) (statement of Antone Minthorn, Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian
Reservation); HearingsBefore the House Subcomm. on Dep 'ts of Commerce, Justice, and
State, the Judiciaryand Related Agencies of the House Comm. on Appropriations, 103d
Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 7, at 373 (1994) (statement of Ted Strong, Executive Director,
Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fish Commission); Jay Minthom, Columiba River InterTribal Fish Commission, Testimony Before the Environmental Protection Agency
Regardingthe Scientific Reassessment of 2, 3, 7,8-TCDD (Dioxin) 2-4 (April 28, 1992);
Harry Smiskin, Testimony Before the Environmental Protection Agency Regarding the
Columbia River Dixon TMDL at the PUD Community Room 2-4 (July 17, 1990)).
261 See Wood, supra note 246, at 1508.
262 See id. at 1528-1532 (citing Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Hodel, 12 Indian L. Rep.
(Am. Indian Law. Training Program) 3065 (D. Mont. May 28, 1985) (mem.), remedy
modified, No. 82-116-BLG (D. Mont. Oct. 8, 1985) (mem.), modified remedy rev'd, 851
F.2d 1152 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that the Department of Interior violated its fiduciary
duty owed to the Cheyenne Tribe by failing to consider the tribe's interests in issuing
coal leases on tracts of public land surrounding the reservation, enjoining further leasing
of tracts near the reservation, and ordering recission of all prior leases); Pyramid Lake
Paiute Tribe of Indians v. Morton, 354 F. Supp. 252 (D.D.C.) (mem.), modified on other
grounds, 360 F. Supp. 669 (D.D.C. 1973), rev'd in part on other grounds, 499 F.2d 1095
(D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 962 (1975) (finding that Secretary of Interior was
obligated, pursuant to his fiduciary duty owed to the tribe, to assert his authority to
preserve water for the tribe); Nance v. Environmental Protection Agency, 645 F.2d 701
(9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1081 (1981) (finding that the EPA owed a
fiduciary duty to the tribe, but that the duty was fulfilled); United States v. Washington
(Phase H), 506 F. Supp. 187 (W.D. Wash. 1980), aff'd, vacated in part, 759 F.2d 1353
(9th Cir. 1985) (per curiam) (en banc), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 994 (1985) (implying a
treaty right to habitat protection and corresponding duty on the federal government and
states to ensure environmental protection of treaty fish)). For a discussion of the federal
government's trust responsibility concerning off-reservation treaty resources see Adele
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In contrast, the trust doctrine has fared less favorably in the
monetary-claim landscape, despite the fact that the Supreme Court has
observed that a damages remedy is essential to deter federal officials from
mismanaging tribal resources.263 When monetary claims are involved,
lower courts are required to assess fiduciary obligations through an
intense, fact-specific inquiry. 264 This makes the trust doctrine a less
effective vehicle, compared to common law causes of action, for tribal
efforts to obtain compensation when government degrades treaty-fish
habitat. Despite the hurdles the trust doctrine presents in claims for
money damages,265 with the tribes' fishing resources on the verge of
irrevocable deterioration, renewed attention to the trust doctrine may be
necessary if other avenues fail to adequately protect treaty-fish habitat or
compensate tribes for their losses.
b. Private Party Liability
Treaty obligations run not merely to the federal and state
governments, but to private parties as well.266 Private parties have no
more authority than governments to exclude the tribes from their fishing
grounds, to deprive them of their fair share of the fish runs, or to destroy
treaty fish,2 67 even if a tribe cedes its occupancy right to land on which the
fishing right runs. 268 Accordingly, private parties who degrade treaty-fish
habitat will, like the government, be required to compensate the tribes for
their losses.
Third-party liability is based on the notion that the right to harvest
fish is a property right that cannot be divested, or abrogated, by changed

Fine, Comment, Off-Reservation Enforcement of the Federal-IndianTrust Responsibility,
7 PuB. LAND L. REv. 117 (1986).
161 In United States v. Mitchell (Mitchell II), the Supreme Court held: "Given
the
existence of a trust relationship, it naturally follows that the Government should be liable
in damages for the breach of its fiduciary duties." United States v. Mitchell (Mitchell II),
463 U.S. 206, 226 (1983).
264 See Wood, supra note 246, at 1534 (1994) (citing United States v. Mitchell
(Mitchell
II), 463 U.S. 206, 226 (1983)).
265 See id.
266 See United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905).

See United States v. Washington (Phase H), 506 F. Supp. 187, 204, 208, (W.D. Wash.
1980) ("[n]either party to the treaties, nor their successors in interest, may act in a manner

267

that destroys the fishery.... Therefore, the correlative duty imposed upon the State (as

well as the United States and third parties) is to refrain from degrading the fish habitat to
an extent that would deprive the tribes of their moderate living needs.").
268 See Winans, 198 U.S. at 371.
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conditions and that treaty right burdens even non-parties to the agreement:
"It is... inconceivable that either party [to the treaty] deliberately agreed
to authorize future settlers to crowd the Indians out of any meaningful use
of their accustomed places to fish., 269 The destruction of the tribes' right
to harvest fish and the exclusion of the tribes from their ancient fishing
places was neither foreseen nor sanctioned by the treaties. 270 If private
party degradation of the treaty fisheries were allowed as a fact of modem
development, the tribes would have only the same rights they "would have
without the treaty-an impotent outcome to negotiations and a convention,
which seemed
to promise more and give the word of the nation for
271
more."
The case which had the most potential to establish a right to bring
claims for money damages to treaty-fish habitat is Nez Perce Tribe v.
Idaho Power Company.272 In Idaho Power, the tribe filed suit against the
power company alleging that the construction and operation of its three
dam Hell's Canyon Complex violated treaty rights by reducing the number
of salmon returning to tribal fishing grounds and by inundating those
grounds with water.273 The Tribe argued that it was entitled to damages
under section 10(c) of the Federal Power Act, which made each licensee
governed by the Act "liable for all damages" to the "property" of others
caused by the construction, maintenance, or operation of its projects.274
Alternatively, the tribe argued that it was entitled to damages under a
treaty right to habitat protection.275
Federal Magistrate Boyle rejected Idaho Power's contention that
there was no federal court jurisdiction, and concluded that section 10(c)
created no new federal cause of action,
but only preexisting
causes of
,
276
action, under which the tribe's claims did not fall.
Magistrate Boyle
then considered, and rejected tribal money damages claims based on state
tort law or federal treaty rights.277 The basis for both conclusions was the
same: the court was persuaded that the tribe did not own the uncaught fish
in a salmon run, and thus had no property rights entitling it to

Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443
U.S. 658, 676 (1979).
270 See id.
271 See Winans, 198 U.S. at 380.
272 See Nez Perce Tribe v. Idaho Power Company, 847 F. Supp. 791 (D. Idaho 1994).
273 See id.
274 See 16 U.S.C. § 803(c) (1994).
275 See Idaho Power, 847 F. Supp. at 791.
276 See id. at 803.
277 See id.
269
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compensation. 27 The court's opinion is an aberration: 279 it failed to
recognize Supreme Court precedent establishing tribal treaty fishing rights
28
as property rights 280 and extending treaty obligations to third-parties. 1
Eventually, the Nez Perce settled the Idaho case for $16.5 million, and a
second case against a Washington power company for $40 million, based
282
on the companies' degradation of treaty fishery resources.
Arguably, tribal fishers' rights are as extensive as fishers without
treaty or property rights who are entitled to common law causes of action
for damages when fish resources are diminished by environmental
harm. 2 83 Historically, wrongful interruption or interference with a
person's fishing rights has given rise to conversion or trespass action for
damages. 2 84 Furthermore, private individuals and businesses have a duty
under the common law to:
provide fish passage, avoid pollution, and use other fish
protection measures. Harm to fishers resulting from the

278 See

id. at 811. Magistrate Boyle commented:
[I]f the Indians had a property interest in the fish, regardless of whether
that interest was created by treaty, the Indians would have a recognized
cause of action against any private party who intentionally or
negligently injured the fish. Therefore, this court bases its decision on
the fact that the Indians do not have a property interest in the fish runs,
rather on the fact that Idaho Power is a private party.
Id.
at
810
n.22.
279
For a blistering criticism of the court's opinion see Blumm, supra note 42, at 481-489;
see also Sanders, supra note 205, at 162.
280 See Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404,
413 (1968).
281 See Winans, 198 U.S. at 381.
282 Telephone Interview with Doug Nash, former counsel, Nez Perce Tribe (Oct. 15,
1999).
See also Mirande, supra note 149, at 39-47.
283
See Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558, 570 (9th Cir. 1974).
2
" Animals are tangible property and intentional acts leading to the destruction of chattels
give rise to a cause of action in tort for conversion. See Oppenheimer Indus., Inc. v.
Johnson Cattle Co., 112 Idaho 423, 426, 732 P.2d 661, 664 (Idaho 1986). A cause of
action in negligence is available for one whose chattel is lost or destroyed through the
negligence of another. See id In the context of fisheries, see, e.g., Union Oil Co. v.
Oppen, 501 F.2d 558, 568 (9th Cir. 1974) (action for damages brought by fishermen);
Snug Harbor Packing Co. v. Schmidt, 394 P.2d 397, 399 (Alaska 1964); Bales v. City of
Tacoma, 20 P.2d 860, 863 (Wash. 1933). See also Carr v. United States, 136 F. Supp.
527, 535 (E.D. Va. 1955); Beacon Oyster Co. v. United States, 63 F. Supp. 761, 764 (Ct.
Cl. 1946); Mansfield & Sons Co. v. United States, 94 Ct. Cl. 397, 421 (1941); State Dep't
of Pollution Control v. International Paper Co., 329 So. 2d 5, 7-8 (Fla. 1976); Jurisich v.
Louisiana S. Oil & Gas Co., 284 So. 2d 173, 182 (La. App. 1973); Department of
Fisheries v. Gillette, 621 P.2d 764, 767 (Wash. Ct. App. 1980) (action for damages
brought by state).
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failure to take these measures is considered reasonably
foreseeable and a sufficient basis for [imposing] trespass,
negligence, or nuisance [liability.] Damage claims brought
by fishermen are one of the 'classic exceptions' [to
admiralty law's pure economic loss rule].285
C. PracticalConsiderations:How Should DamagesBe Calculated?
The main problem with tribal claims for money damages is
determining the amount of compensation due to the tribes. Traditionally,
compensation awarded in common law conversion cases involving private
parties, 286 as well as in takings cases against the government, is the fair
market value (FMV) of the lost property. 287 Tribal property rights are not
in the fish habitat itself, but in the fish which depend on pristine habitat.288
Therefore, tribal efforts seeking compensation for degraded treaty-fish
habitat are actually implicit within primary claims for lost revenues in fish
destroyed by such degraded habitat.
Commentators suggest that compensation could not be made for
lost fish, because the tribes cannot claim ownership in uncaught fish, and
also because the approximate number of fish lost, and the value of those
fish would be impossible to determine. 289 However, "a rose by any other
name would smell as sweet. ' ' 2 90 In the end, the only way to place a value
on the treaty harvest right is to place value on the uncaught fish. The
29 1
reasoning goes like this: the salmon's return was once so predictable,
and generated such consistent tribal income, 292 that the tribes essentially
had a secured interest in the fish, despite the fact that the fish were not yet
caught in tribal nets. The tribes are now deprived of this income generated
from fish sales-fish which are now uncaught as a result of environmental
295 Sanders, supra note 205, at 166-167.
286

See

ZYGMUNT

J.B.

PLATER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: NATURE,

LAW, AND SOCIETY 206 (2d ed. 1998).

See Wheeler v. City of Pleasant Grove, 833 F.2d 267, 270 (11th Cir. 1987) ("The
owner's loss is measured by the extent to which governmental action has deprived him of
287

an interest in property. The value of that interest, in turn, is determined by isolating it as

a component of the overall fair market value of the affected property." (citations
omitted)); see also United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 511 (1979)
(explaining
that FMV is the compensation in condemnation cases).
288
See CHILDERHOSE & TRIM, supra note 9, at 26-27.
289 See Roels, supra note 30, at 404-405.
290 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, ROMEO AND JULIET, Act
291 See LANE, supra note 2, at 7.
292

See id.
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degradation.
Specifically, the measure of damages would be the
difference between the retail value of the amount of salmon to which the
tribes were entitled, had the right not been interfered with by
environmental degradation, and the value of the salmon the tribes actually
received.293 In this sense, the measure of damages appears to award
money for uncaught fish-but in reality, any awarded money simply
compensates the tribes for damages to their treaty harvest rights caused by
habitat degradation.
Illustratively, in two cases that the Nez Perce tribe settled with
private power companies, damages were measured as the value the fish
would have had in a commercial market had the harvest right not been
interfered with.294 A significant amount of data was produced that
reflected the tribe's historic harvests, the harvests' consistency, and the
tribe's ability to capitalize on their harvests. 295 Several tribes have now
prepared an analysis of damages by estimating losses of 243 to 410
million pounds of salmon after lower Snake River Dam construction. The
value of those lost fish, with inflation, could reach. into the billions of
296
dollars.
Lost fish revenues may be inadequate because the measure fails to
take into account the collateral cultural effects caused by the salmon's
demise. Several Northwest tribes contend that the loss of salmon has
caused deterioration in tribal members' health due to improper diet,
including increased diabetes and heart disease rates, higher alcoholism
rates, illiteracy, juvenile delinquency, the loss of tribal language, and the
decline of tribal spiritual and religious practices.297 Any compensation
regime, whether based on the market value of lost fish or other, must be
expanded to compensate for the tribes' actual losses-including damages
to cultural values and to future generations who were to culturally benefit
See Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation v. United States, 43 Ind. Cl.
Comm'n 505 (1978). Compare Kimball v. Callahan, 493 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1974)
(measuring damages to tribal hunting and fishing rights caused by government regulation
as the value the game and fish tribal members would take if completely free from
regulation, less the value of the limited amounts of game and fish taken by members
subject to state regulation).
294 This is the measure that the arbitrator used to calculate damages in Nez Perce Tribe v.
Idaho Power Corp., which resulted in a settlement in the amount of $16.5 million for the
293

tribe. Telephone interview with Doug Nash, former counsel for Nez Perce Tribe (Oct. 15,

1999).

See id.
296 See Roels, supra note 30, at 376 n.10 (citing Laura Berg, Tribes Release Salmon
Restoration
Plan, WANA CHINOOK TYMOO, Issues 2 and 3 1995, at 14).
297
See Tribal Circumstances,supra note 22.
295
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from-the treaty right.29 I Critics contendthat placing a value on the cultural
meaning of fish may be difficult, if not impossible. 299 Furthermore, even
if a compensation scheme were devised to compensate tribes for lost
culture, it would not be effective in takings claims against the government
because the Fifth Amendment does not provide for compensation for
3
government "takings" of culture, only property. 00
A narrow view would suggest that 'money damages are
inappropriate because it is impossible to calculate the value of lost cultural
resources.301 The value of lost cultural resources could be measured
alternatively, however, as the cost associated with the funding of tribal
alcoholic programs, literacy programs in tribal schools, tribal language
courses, and juvenile-delinquent diversion programs. 30 2 Furthermore, the
Government already provides tremendous financial support to the tribes
for social programs. 303 ,Assuming, arguendo, that the government could
be held responsible for culture lost as a result of salmon-run degradation,
the government could compensate tribes for their losses by increasing the
amount of tribal payments, and perhaps by even designating the increased
amount for culture restoring programs.
Where compensatory damages provide only money for lost fish, a
punitive damages -award could enhance a compensatory damages award
and account for lost cultural resources and degraded fish habitat. The
purpose of punitive damages is to punish fault, reckless disregard for
others, or a defendant's conduct that is found to be "willful," or
"wanton." 3°4 In the context of degraded treaty-fish habitats, punitive
damages may serve other purposes, including camouflaged compensation.
A large punitive damages award against parties who destroy treaty fish
with impunity would help capture and internalize habitat restoration or
cultural resource costs that cannot be recovered in a traditional
compensatory damages award.305

298

See Roels, supra note 30, at 405.

299 See

id.
See U.S. CONST. Amend. v.
301 See Roels, supra note 30, at 405.
302 See Mirande, supra note 149, at 57 (advising that, instead of cash, long-term trustoriented payment schemes should be encouraged).
303 See Roels, supra note 30, at 376 n.10 (citing Laura Berg, Tribes Release Salmon
Restoration
Plan, WANA CHINOOK TYMOO, Issues 2 and 3 1995, at 14).
3
04 PLATER, supra note 286,
at 208.
301 See id.
3
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VI. ALTERNATIVE TO MONEY DAMAGES: STREAM ENHANCEMENT AND
RESTORATION

If tribes have money in their pockets for their lost fish, the money
compensates them for their loss, but does little in terms of preventing
future loss or improving salmon habitat. Five conditions must be present
in order for salmon and steelhead trout to survive: "(1) access to and from
the sea; (2) an adequate supply of good-quality water; (3) a sufficient
amount of suitable gravel for spawning and egg incubation; (4) an ample
supply of food; and (5) sufficient shelter." 3°6 An "alteration of even one
of these essential, finely-balanced requirements will affect the production
potential., 30 7 Historically, courts have reaffirmed the notion that tribal
treaties reserve to the tribes rights to a sufficient amount of water instream
to fulfill their treaties' fishing purposes.308 Under the rationale of this
reserved water rights doctrine, the courts have restricted damaging
activities resulting from other parties' exercise of their own water
rights,30 9 thereby implicitly recognizing a right to restoration of tribal
fisheries. If a court were to definitively recognize a treaty right to habitat
protection, treaty tribes may be able to rely on reserved water rights
doctrine to secure a habitat restoration remedy in other contexts. One of
the first cases to use the reserved water doctrine to imply a right to fish

3

6 United States v. Washington (Phase II), 506 F. Supp 187, 203 (W.D. Wash. 1980).

307

Id. at 203 (citing United States Fish and Wildlife Service, Washington Department of

Fisheries and Washington Department of Game, Joint Statement Regarding the Biology,
Status, Management, and Harvest of Salmon andSteelhead Resources of the Puget Sound
and Olympic PeninsularDrainage Area of Western Washington (1973) (Joint Biology
Statement) at 17).
308 See Blumm, supra note 42, at 470. See also United States v. Anderson, 6 Indian
L.
Rep. F-129 at F-131 (E.D. Wash. July 23, 1979), 591 F. Supp. I (E.D. Wash. 1982),
aff'd, 736 F.2d 1358 (9th Cir. 1984); Colville Confederate Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42
(9th Cir. 1981) (Colville II); United States v. Adair, 478 F. Supp. 336, 345 (D. Or. 1979),
aff'd, 723 F.2d 1394, at 1414-15; see also Order Re: Treaty Reserved Water Rights at
Usual and Accustomed Fishing Places, State Dep't of Ecology v. Acquavella, No. 77-201484-5, (Wash. Sup. Ct. Mar. 1, 1995) (recognizing a limited right of habitat protection
"to maintain fish life" in the river for Yakima Basin tributaries with treaty fishing
grounds); Order Re: "Flushing Flows" Acquavella, No. 77-2-01484-5, (Wash. Sup. Ct.
Apr. 13, 1995) (requiring fish flows to flush juvenile salmon downstream and
recognizing a duty of the Bureau of Reclamation to provide flows to "maintain all life
stages"
of salmon).
3
09 See id.
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habitat restoration was United States v. Anderson,3 1 ° involving a dispute
over water rights to the Chamokane Creek in northeast Washington.311
The court concluded that a purpose of the Spokane Indian Reservation was
to ensure tribal access to fish for food and the maintenance of Chamokane
Creek for fishing, 31 2 and as such, the tribe was entitled to the amount of
reserved water sufficient to preserve their fishing rights.313 The court's
holding is striking, because it essentially implies a treaty right of fisheries
restoration and maintenance: the defendant was required to release waters
to maintain water temperature below sixty-eight degrees Fahrenheit,
necessary for native trout propagation, and in no case less than twenty
cubic feet per second. 4
In another tribal water rights case, Colville Confederate Tribes v.
Walton, the Ninth Circuit also introduced a restorative component to the
treaty right to fish.31 5 The court ruled that when the Colville Indian
Reservation was created, sufficient appurtenant water was reserved to
permit crop irrigation on the reservation and to provide sufficient water for
the tribes to develop an on-reservation trout fishery to compensate for
historic salmon runs lost as a result of the construction of the Grand
Coulee Dam. 3 16 The court observed that the tribe had a vested property
right in reserved water, and could use the water in any lawful manner,

subject only to restrictions on the quantity, rather than the purpose of
water use. 3 17 Accordingly, the court permitted the tribe to use some of its
irrigation water to restore flows in a creek in order to promote trout
spawning. 31 As in the Anderson case, by reaffirming the tribe's rights to
use water to reestablish their fisheries, the Walton court implicitly

recognized the right to habitat restoration.

See United States v. Anderson, 6 Indian L. Rep. at F-131 (E.D. Wash. July 23, 1979),
United States v. Anderson, 591 F. Supp. 1 (E.D. Wash. 1982), aff'd, 736 F.2d 1358 (9th
Cir. 1984).
310

311

312

See id.
See id. The Anderson case did not involve a Stevens treaty; the right to fish was a

purpose of the tribe's 1877 reservation, established by Executive Order. See id. at F-130.
13See id. ("The Court therefore holds that the Tribe has the reserved right to sufficient
water to preserve fishing in the Chamokane Creek.").
314 See id.
315 See Colville Confederate Tribes V.Walton, 647 F.2d 42 (9th Cir. 1981) (Colville II)
3 16
See id. at 48.
317

See id.

311 See

id. at46. The district court had held that the tribe was not entitled to water to
promote trout spawning because the federal government was supplying hatchery fish. See

Colville I, 460 F. Supp. 1320, 1330 (E.D. Wash. 1978), affd in part, rev'd in part

Colville II, 647 F.2d at 48 (1981).
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In United States v. Adair; the United States; along with the
Klamath and Modoc Indians, sued the state of Oregon to settle a dispute of
water rights in the Williamson River system. 319 A panel of the Ninth
Circuit concluded that the Klamath tribe had a "time immemorial" right
"to as much water on the Reservation lands as they need to protect their
hunting and fishing rights. 3 20 The court characterized the tribal fishing
right as a negative right, enabling the tribes "to prevent other appropriators
from depleting the streams [sic] waters below a protected level in any
area" where the treaty fishing right applied. 32 1 However, the court
refused to find that the tribe was entitled to restoration out of the fear of
imposing a "wilderness servitude" on the reservation. 322 Instead, the court
held that any restoration right must be tied to the "moderate living"
standard as established by the Supreme Court in Passenger Fishing
Vessel.323 In other words, tribes are entitled to restoration
of fisheries at a
324
level that will supply them with a "moderate living.'
The courts' use of the reserved-water doctrine to imply a right to
habitat restoration could be promising if applied to compel fish habitat
restoration in other contexts. However, a restoration remedy would suffer
great practical problems, especially when trying to determine the
responsible parties. No single activity is solely responsible for the
anadromous fisheries' decline, rather many activities have had a
cumulative impact. 325 Dams, diversions, and sedimentation caused by
forest roads and timber harvesting are the most often cited reasons for the
fisheries' decline, 326 but other activities also contribute significantly to fish
habitat degradation, such as: "channelization, particularly of spawning
streams; agricultural practices, including stream diversion and livestockcaused degradation; urban and industrial development of lowland stream
habitat; estuarine construction; and gravel removal from streambeds and
banks., 327 Because the reasons for salmon habitat destruction are legion,

See United States v. Adair, 478 F. Supp. 336, 345 (D. Or. 1979), aff'd, 723 F.2d at
1414-15.
320 Id.
32' Adair, 723 F.2d at 1411.
319

322

SeeAdair,723 F.2d at 1414.
See Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n,
443 U.S. 658, 686 (1979).
324 See Blumm, supra note 42, at 473 n.326.
325 See Monson, supra note 69, at 469, 473.
326 See id. at 474.
327 Id. (citing Affidavit of Donald Chapman at 2, United States v. Washington (Phase II),
506 F. Supp. 187 (W.D. Wash.1980).
323
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the value of a habitat restoration remedy to the tribes is diminished, but
not completely without value.
A treaty habitat protection right that entitles tribes to compel
habitat restoration would be most effective against major sources of fish
and fish habitat destruction, such as hydroelectric dams. One proposal to
restore Northwest salmon advocates dam removal. 328 The government
annually spends hundreds of millions of dollars to rectify the effects dams
have on salmon, 329 but mitigation efforts have had little success. 330 Dam
removal debates are complex, as there is no assurance that dam removal
will in fact prevent the salmon's extinction.33 1 The removal of the
Edwards Dam on the Kennebec River in Maine, highlighted by Secretary
of the Interior Bruce Babbitt's challenge to dam owners and operators to
demonstrate "by hard facts [that] the continued operation of a dam is in
the public interest, economically and environmentally,, 332 however, is
promising precedent for future dam removals on the Snake River.
A tribal right to compel fish-habitat restoration could not only help
tribes secure habitat restoration in areas destroyed by dam building, but
also combat the effects of less-significant activities that combine to
destroy treaty fish, especially when such a right is viewed as an extension
of the Indian trust doctrine. Tribes could invoke the Indian trust doctrine
to compel stringent government enforcement of current habitat protection
laws or creation of new legislation for fish-habitat protection.333
Fortunately, the tribes may not need to rely on a right to compel fish
habitat enhancement and restoration, because many local governments in
the Northwest have already voluntarily committed themselves to such
efforts.334

328 See Joseph, supra note 16, at 51. For the case supporting dam removal on the Snake
River, see generally Blumm, supra note 131.
329 See id. at 60.

330 See id. (describing dismal return rates of salmon despite government efforts to
mitigate the effects of dams).
331 See id.
33 2
See id. at 61.
333 See Wood, supra note 246, at 1471 (contending that tribes are entitled to a writ
of
mandamus to compel governent observance of treaty rights).
334 See Frank Vinluan, The Sammamish and Salmon Get Some ReLeaf, (Oct.
5, 1999)
(reporting local government sponsored efforts to restore salmon habitat along
Sammamish River), available at http://www.seattletimes.com/news/local/html98/
fish_19991005.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2001); the state of Washington has enacted a
program that pays farmers to protect salmon streams on their property. The program

pays rent to farmers for land around streams to create buffer zones along up to 3,000
miles of environmentally sensitive streams. The program requires farmers to fence off
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IS RECOGNITION OF A RIGHT TO MONETARY DAMAGES

REALLY

NECESSARY IN LIGHT OF OTHER PROTECTIVE LAWS?

Federal statutes may also provide tribes with a cause of action for
money damages when essential fish habitat conditions are degraded and
treaty fishing rights are affected. The Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) 335 provides tribes
with a source of recovery when parties are liable under CERCLA for
336
"damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources."
"Natural resources" are defined within CERCLA to include fish and
wildlife "belonging to, managed by, held in trust by, appertaining to, or
otherwise controlled by . . . an Indian tribe." 337 CERCLA's natural
resource damage recovery scheme provides that the federal government,
state government, or tribal government, as trustee of the natural resources,
may seek compensatory damages for the loss of the resource. CERCLA
recognizes an Indian tribe's property interest in fish and wildlife and,
accordingly, provides for recovery of monetary damages. Treaty tribes
have also employed the Federal Power Act 338 and the National
Environmental Policy Act 339 to protect their fisheries from hydroelectric
or other development that threaten essential fish habitat
power projects
340
conditions.
Most federal statutes have no provisions for recovery of damages.
Section 505 of the Clean Water Act allows for natural damages recoveries,
but only due to hazardous waste releases. 34 1 Section 10(c) of the Federal
streams and plant trees and shrubs to enhance salmon habitat. Agriculture runoff has
been blamed as a major factor in pollution of salmon-bearing waters in Washington. See
Enticements to Help FarmersSave Salmon, TACOMA NEWS TRIBUNE, Oct. 29, 1998, at
A12.
Other fish habitat enhancing and restoring activities that the state could require of
those responsible for degrading fish habitat are to widen river channels to ease fish
passage, reconnect side channels, restore tributaries, create estuary habitat, remove
barriers to fish passage, cease water diversion and install fish ladders in places where
streams are diverted, plant trees along streams' riparian areas to provide salmon with
necessary shade and protection and filter sediment from runoff.
33' 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994).
336 See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(C).
337 See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(16).
331 See 16 U.S.C. §§ 791a-828c (1994).
139 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370d (1994).
340 See, e.g., Washington Dep't of Fisheries v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 801
F.2d 1516, 1517-19 (9th Cir. 1986) (vacating preliminary permits for failure to give
adequate consideration to resource protection, including tribal fishery concerns).
341 See Oil and Hazardous Substance Liability Act, 33 U.S.C.A. § 1321 (1997).
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Power Act allows for damage claims versus FERC-licensed dams,
although the Nez Perce tribe was unsuccessful in relying on this provision
to recover money damages. 342 The Endangered Species Act of 1973343
might provide Northwest tribes with monetary relief; under the ESA, the
government .assesses damages for unlawful takings of endangered or
threatened species. 344 Tribal reliance on the ESA would be tenuous,
however, because of the uncertain effects that the Act has on tribal treaty
fishing rights. In fact, one private interest group has actually used the
ESA to file suit, claiming that the government has violated the Act by
allowing Indian tribes to exercise their treaty fishing rights in Puget Sound
345
and the Columbia River.
IX. APPLICATION OF THE RIGHT To HABITAT PROTECTION AND MONEY
DAMAGES OUTSIDE THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST

The significance of a treaty habitat protection right and the
corresponding right to bring claims for money damages, if that right is
infringed, reaches far beyond the Pacific Northwest and may be asserted
by other Indian tribes to protect their reserved hunting and fishing rights.
In Minnesota, the Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians has been
embroiled with the state over off-reservation fishing and hunting rights.
Eventually in Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, the U.S.
Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, ruled that the tribe retained its
aboriginal inland fishing and hunting rights on thirteen million acres of
ceded public land provided for under 1836 and 1855 treaties. 346 However,
recognition of tribal fishing and hunting rights may be just the beginning
of the Chippewa's foray into the judicial realm. If the land upon which
the tribe's fishing and hunting rights has been degraded and deer and elk
populations have plummeted as a result of state or private action, the right
to sue for money damages or habitat protection will then be a very
important right to the Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians.

342

See Nez Perce Tribe v. Idaho Power Co., 847 F. Supp. 791 (D. Idaho 1994).

343 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1994).

344 See id. § 1540.
3 See Feds Sued Over Fishing Permits For Tribes, WALL STREET JOURNALNORTHWEST, Aug. 25, 1999, available in 1999 WL-WSJ 24911239 (reporting that
Common Sense Salmon Recovery, a coalition of real-estate and agriculture interests,
claim the National Marine Fisheries Service is jeopardizing runs of salmon that are
classified as threatened or endangered).
346 See Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians,
526 U.S. 172 (1999).
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The Klamath Tribe in Oregon may also find it necessary to rely on
the right to bring claims for money damages or habitat restoration in light
of the destruction to their historic hunting grounds. 34 7 Klamath hunting
grounds have been subject to timber harvesting practices of the U.S.
Forest Service, and as a result mule-deer populations have plummeted.348
Because deer is an essential staple for indigent Klamath tribal members,
the tribe is trying to protect the habitat to ensure their hunting rights
remain fruitful; however, the number of deer has been reduced from
thirteen to fourteen mule deer per mile to about seven per mile. 349 The
tribe successfully enjoined the habitat-destructive harvesting practices, but
the injunction does not compensate the tribe for the degradation of their
treaty habitat protection right, nor does the injunction necessarily ensure
the future of the mule deer. 350 The Klamath Tribe may find it necessary,
someday, to rely upon the right to bring claims for money damages to their
treaty-reserved habitat protection rights.
In a more general sense, the treaty right to habitat protection, and
the corresponding right to damages if the right is degraded, might develop
into increased off-reservation habitat management rights for treaty tribes.
Tribes have been successful in exercising tribal involvement in other offreservation contexts where subject matter is of significant importance to
tribes. For instance tribes have been successful in gaining jurisdiction of
Indian children living off-reservation, authority over graves and funerary
objects, treatment as state status under several environmental laws which
affect off-reservation activities, and tribal regulatory control over
members' off-reservation hunting and fishing.3 51 If a tribal right to habitat
protection is definitively recognized, it may encourage tribes to become
more involved in habitat management-on and off the reservation. Tribes
would then have an incentive to direct resources to habitat restoration and
public education of native culture and the importance of treaty reserved
rights to hunt and fish.

347

See Klamath Tribe v. Oregon, Civ. No. 96-381-HA (D.Or. Oct. 2, 1996).

See Jess Brown, Do Tribal Off-Reservation Hunting and Fishing Rights Include the
Right to Habitat Protection?, LETTER OF THE LAW (Feb. 1999), available at
http://www.lclark.edu/-lotl/volume5issue4/tribal.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2001).
349 See id.
34s

350
351

See id.
See id.
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X. CONCLUSION

Recognition of a tribal right to bring claims for money damages
when treaty-fish habitat is degraded would compensate tribes for and
minimize damage to treaty fisheries. A damages remedy stems from the
nature of tribal property rights in Northwest salmon and from treaty rights
to habitat protection. Aided by a definitive judicial explanation of the
scope of a habitat protection right, tribal damages claims could help ensure
the future of the tribes' historic harvest rights-rights which they were led
to believe would always be theirs in exchange for vast amounts of land.
Making the case for tribal damages claims in the context of treaty fishing
rights raises awareness of the losses tribes will suffer if the salmon are
allowed to disappear, the losses the tribes have already suffered, and the
economic implications salmon extinction will have for the federal and
state governments, as well as private parties. Ultimately, money can never
replace salmon; recognition of a tribal right to money damages claims is
but a vehicle to help government and private parties-who sometimes
understand issues only in terms of dollars-heed tribal advice in the effort
to save the salmon.

